Further to this 2015 post,
and this tweet by Tom Countryman (formerly a senior career State Department diplomat, fired by the Trump administration soon after the 2017 inauguration and an old friend, currently doing this),
here is the article (Mr Countryman was commenting on this tweet by Kingston Reif):
Is ‘Escalate to Deescalate’ Part of Russia’s Nuclear Toolbox?
The phrase “escalate to deescalate” [or, as one used to put it, “a shot across the bows“–but now one that causes real damage, one trusts just counter-force] has worked its way into American security vocabulary and onto the pages of our strategic documents. It describes a supposedly new Russian plan to use limited nuclear strikes in a local/regional conflict, the belief being that such an escalation from conventional2 to nuclear conflict would shock an adversary into suing for peace. In reaction to this alleged doctrine, U.S. policy makers have already ordered the development of new weapon systems and capabilities to ensure Russia’s plan cannot work against the United States. Russia’s political leaders, however, say they don’t have such a plan and that “escalate to deescalate” doesn’t exist in their doctrine at all.
…Spoiler alert: Russia does plan for using nuclear strikes to deescalate (that is, to end) and win conflicts. So does the United States [emphasis added].
What Does the US Mean When Accusing Russia of an ‘Escalate to Deescalate’ Policy?
The phrase “escalate to deescalate” first appeared in American briefings and documents rather than Russian. The wording made its debut in official text in June 2015 when then Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. James Winnefeld, used it in testimony to the House Committee on Armed Services: “Russian military doctrine includes what some have called an ‘escalate to deescalate’ strategy—a strategy that purportedly seeks to deescalate a conventional conflict through coercive threats, including limited nuclear use. We think that this label is dangerously misleading. Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire. Escalation is escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate escalation.”3
By 2018, the phrase had entered official U.S. manuals when speaking about Russian nuclear doctrine. The Defense Department’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states: “Moscow threatens and exercises [i.e., rehearses] limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Some in the United States refer to this as Russia’s ‘escalate to deescalate’ doctrine.”4
…the concept of using nuclear weapons to manage the escalation or deescalation of a conflict was a very real strategy used by both Russia and the U.S. during the Cold War. It remains today a part of American nuclear strategy. Department of Defense 2019 Joint Publication 3-72, Nuclear Operations, says: “Employment of nuclear weapons can radically alter or accelerate the course of a campaign. A nuclear weapon could be brought into the campaign as a result of perceived failure in a conventional campaign, potential loss of control or regime, or to escalate the conflict to sue for peace on more favorable terms.”6
The Nuclear Operations publication doesn’t use the term “escalate to deescalate,” but the concept it identifies is exactly the same…
Examining the Evidence for ‘Escalate to Deescalate’
Like most countries, Russia classifies its plans for military operations, especially nuclear operations, making it difficult to know whether the concept of “escalate to deescalate” is reflected in Russian plans.9 But we can get insight into their content through professional articles and papers on the subject. These writings greatly support the contention that Russian nuclear thinking includes using limited nuclear strikes to deescalate a conflict, even in cases where the survival of the Russian state is not at risk.
Although “escalate to deescalate” emerged in U.S. discussions around 2015, Russian nuclear experts have been debating the utility of such a strategy since at least the late 1990s. Their discussions have not confined escalation only to nuclear weapons but by any means, including nuclear weapons…
While Russian military writing provides a clear indication that “escalate to deescalate” is an existing concept in Russian nuclear thinking, an examination of Russia’s military exercises provides a less clear answer…
Conclusion
In the end, although the phrase “escalate to deescalate” is not used in openly published Russian doctrine, the Russian professional articles above and others make clear that using nuclear weapons to deescalate a conflict is most definitely part of Russia’s nuclear toolbox. We are less sure, however, whether Russia’s understanding of “escalate to deescalate” includes preemptive or preventive nuclear strikes. Patrushev suggested yes; Putin suggested no. The reader must decide [emphasis added].
The emergence of the phrase “escalate to deescalate” has generated much debate, not only between the U.S. and Russia but also among U.S. and Western military experts. Some U.S. experts object to it because it is not the phrase the Russians themselves use to describe their strategy. Other experts prefer resurrecting the classic Cold War terminology of escalation control. Still others see the phrase as glib and insufficient to describe the unpredictable outcomes a limited nuclear strike could cause.
These are all fair criticisms. Nothing—certainly no three-word phrase—could fully describe the possible effects of a limited nuclear strike. But the phrase serves a good purpose: It brings attention to an option for using nuclear weapons that remains in the toolbox for both Russia and the United States. It has focused military experts, political leaders and the general public on a dangerous problem that remains with us from Cold War days—the risk of a conventional conflict escalating into a nuclear war.
Hypersonics (ballistic or cruise missiles) would seem peachy keen, er, particularly suited weapons– conventionally or nuclear armed–with which to implement that “escalate to de-escalate” approach, whichever side has them. See, e.g., the end of this recent post–though the acting US Navy secretary does seem a bit OTT for the present moment:
Mark Collins
Twitter: @Mark3Ds
Mark Collins 3Ds Blog 
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