Department of National Defence spokesperson says special forces doing ‘contingency planning’
Christian Paas-Lang · CBC News · Posted: Oct 29, 2023 5:29 PM EDT | Last Updated: 6 hours ago
sraeli tanks manoeuvre inside the Gaza Strip, as seen from Israel, October 29, 2023. Israel is escalating its ground operations in Gaza. (Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters)
Canadian special forces members are in Israel helping Canada’s embassy there with “contingency planning,” a Department of National Defence spokesperson confirmed to CBC News on Sunday.
“As there is potential for the escalation of hostilities in the Middle East, including at the border separating Israel and Lebanon, Global Affairs Canada has requested [Canadian Armed Forces] support to ensure a rapid response should the security situation rapidly deteriorate and support for the evacuation of Canadians is required,” the department said in a statement.
“In support of Global Affairs Canada, [Canadian Armed Forces] personnel from Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) are assisting the Canadian embassy in Israel with contingency planning.”
In a statement earlier in the week, Defence Minister Bill Blair said 300 CAF members are now in the region, with a task force headquartered in Cyprus.
Officials did not further elaborate on what special forces members were doing in the area. Global News first reported Sunday that special forces members were present in Israel.
The Canadian military has already been active in the region as the conflict between Israel and Hamas has intensified, since the latter’s attacks on Oct. 7.
A family embraces after arriving in Toronto from Athens, on a repatriation flight out of Israel on Oct. 13, 2023. (Evan Mitsui/CBC)
Military planes ran several evacuation flights from Israel to Greece in the weeks after the war began. At the time the flights ended, Canada had helped around 1,600 citizens, permanent residents and their families leave Israel.
Canada warned Saturday that citizens in Lebanon should leave that country while they still can. There is significant concern that as fighting intensifies in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah — an Iran-backed Lebanese political party and armed movement that supports Hamas — could fully enter into the conflict. There have already been clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border.
An estimated 40,000 to 75,000 Canadians are living in Lebanon at any given time, according to government data.
David Perry is the president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and the host of the weekly podcast Defence Deconstructed.
“How are we going to increase our spending allocation to a minimum of 2 per cent when we’re already cutting back [on] funding the military?” So asked Conservative MP Cheryl Gallant at a recent hearing of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.
Ms. Gallant’s question references NATO’s defence investment pledge: that all allies, including Canada, will spend at least 2 per cent of their gross domestic product on defence annually. Current NATO data shows Canada is nowhere near that threshold, as we will spend at most 1.38 per cent of our GDP on defence this year. The government’s long-gestating Defence Policy Review, which might have helped boost the defence budget, is nowhere to be found.
Against that backdrop, the federal government announced in August that all departments will be required to collectively cut $15-billion from their budgets over the next five years, and $4.5-billion annually thereafter. Although Budget 2023 noted the Canadian Armed Forces would be exempt from the budget knife, the Department of National Defence’s overall exemption appears to be pretty narrow. Deputy Defence Minister Bill Matthews recently told the Standing Committee on National Defence that the department may be asked to cut spending by around $900-million annually over the course of four years, once cuts are fully implemented.
Cutting the defence budget will in and of itself send a troubling message to NATO about Canada’s credibility. Most members of the alliance are now bolstering their defence spending in the face of the most significant war in Europe since 1945, not wielding a budget knife. These cuts will likely further erode Canadian credibility by reducing our military’s operational readiness.
Recent commentary has suggested this exercise is equivalent to just a smidge of overall spending, juxtaposing a few billion dollars in reductions with the $500-billion the federal government spends annually overall. If the DND was left free to identify $900-million in savings from within its total current planned spending of over $26-billion, that logic might hold. But that is not what is being directed. Instead, the DND is being asked to reduce by 15 per cent the $5-billion it was planning to spend this year on consulting and other professional services, particularly management consulting. This means that the bulk of DND’s reductions, about $750-million a year, are supposed to come from spending on contracted services.
This is problematic for two reasons. First, the rationale for reducing consulting spending across the federal government is that these expenditures have continued to grow despite a nearly 40 per cent increase in the size of the civil service since 2015. With 100,000 more bureaucrats today than before Justin Trudeau became Prime Minister, the government can get by with fewer consultants, the logic holds. But Defence has not followed this trend. Yes, DND’s spending on services and consultants has increased, but the military is short 8,000 full-time troops, so that spending has in part been used to make up for a lack of in-house capacity.
Half of the total professional and special service spending by the DND is for engineering and architectural services, which represents a range of activities supporting efforts to build, buy and maintain buildings and equipment. While some maintenance is done by our troops, much of the work on our vehicles, aircraft and ships is performed by contractors. For years, Canada has actually been spending less on maintenance and in-service support than it should, so any cuts will reduce our ability to put ships to sea, planes in the sky or vehicles into the field. Given it is currently operating with 40-year-old fighter jets and 30-year-old warships, Canada’s military needs more money for maintenance, not less, if the government wants to keep meeting our NORAD and NATO commitments and deliver on our Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The details of how the DND actually spends money on services show that savings will be hard to come by without impacting the operational readiness of the forces. Defence does hire “management consultants,” but last year less than 2 per cent of its service spending ($72-million) was devoted to that category. The DND did, however, devote about $247-million to military health care, $140-million to training and education, and $107-million to protection services, the latter mostly for security guards. There may be efficiencies to find in these areas, but drastically reducing spending on health care and education for troops at a time when retention is a major problem seems unwise, as does leaving our bases unguarded.
However much the DND may want to avoid maintenance spending, if the department is not granted flexibility to apportion its reductions, it is tough to see how it can avoid doing so, given the composition of the defence budget and the way this round of budget reductions is being structured. Contrary to the public narrative, at Defence at least, these cuts will require hard decisions.
D/C: Current military recruitment is way down and the forces are thousands of unfilled positions .. this will hardly increase morale.
(Caption for photo at top of the post: “A woman stranded by landslides near Agassiz, B.C., is pulled into a helicopter by Canadian Forces members on Nov. 15, 2021. (Submitted by Cory Lysohirka)”.)
Ann Fitz-Gerald is the director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs and a professor of international security. Jason Donville is a Toronto-based hedge fund manager. Both are graduates of the Royal Military College of Canada.
The Canadian Armed Forces are in crisis.
General Wayne Eyre, the Chief of the Defence Staff, has advised Canadians that our armed forces’ fighting capability is greatly constrained; he announced an immediate halt to all non-essential activities and a focus on recruitment and retention. The military is estimated to be short-staffed by about 10,000 members. Even the standing force of about 50,000 is in question; that may simply be a number on a piece of paper.In the aftermath of Hurricane Fiona in Atlantic Canada, the CAF struggled to put several hundred troops into Nova Scotia for a week [see post noted at end].
No single government can be blamed for the current state of affairs, and many reasons can be cited for the low staffing and retention rates. But two issues stand out. The first is that the Department of National Defence is chronically underfunded. Forget that Canada is only spending 1.27 per cent of GDP on defence while promising its NATO allies that we will increase that to 2 per cent; it’s not clear why any career-minded potential soldier would be attracted to the CAF in its diminished state. There have been long delays in basic training; military bases often sit half-empty; our planes, ships and tanks are old, in some cases depressingly so; and there is currently a waiting list for housing for approximately 4,500 service members and their families.
The military’s culture is the second morale-busting issue. Over the past decade, CAF leadership has been caught up in scandals that have created the perception that, rightly or wrongly, it is dominated by – or at least tolerant of – sexual misconduct and far-right sympathizers. However, what is not often discussed in parallel to this is the extent to which other prominent Canadian institutions, such as universities, experience similar toxic culture problems and recurring misdemeanours…
Gen. Eyre has asked for patience as he tries to restore the capability of our armed forces, rightly suggesting that this process will take years. The critical question is whether he can do this on his own. We believe that the answer is no – not out of a lack of faith in the Chief of the Defence Staff, but because the problems are both strategic and tactical. Gen. Eyre can support the latter concern, but without addressing strategic issues of funding and cross-institutional leadership culture – and without the government’s full support behind a multiyear resource plan – the CAF’s problems will only get worse.
If the CAF deteriorates further, the implications for Canada are grave. Internationally, Canada will be limited in its ability to provide the resources needed to oppose tyranny in an increasingly hostile global environment. It will diminish our ability to shape policies among our allies and it will depress the confidence of the U.S., with whom Canada shares a primary concern for the defence of the North American continent…Domestically, we could lose the capability to respond to civil disturbances and disasters, even as extreme weather-based threats grow in scale and frequency.
So what should be done? A good place to start is to recognize how bad things already are.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Melanie Joly, gave a speech on November 9, which was meant to lift the curtain a bit on a long-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy. (No transcript of the speech has yet been released but you can catch in on CPAC’s Youtube channel:
There was talk of increasing our military presence in the region. But this comes at a time when the military is suffering a severe manpower shortage, has had to put all non-essential operations on hold, is faced with a problem of an outdated armoury, and a still-broken defence procurement system. Flying the flag in the region through occasional military visits is not the same as increasing our military presence. Any real promise along those lines would have to compete with the demands that will be placed on the CAF for an increased and sustained presence on the NATO front lines in Europe, and the requirements for a heavy operational tempo to respond to civil emergencies occasioned by climate change impacts. The forthcoming defence strategy (also expected sometime soon) may or may not address this thorny issue, but one has to wonder how much daylight exists between the Foreign and Defence Ministers about what, realistically, can be done and where priorities truly lie.
As for expanding our defence and security partnerships in the region, absent a serious increase in hard power capabilities, which seems unlikely, our best bet is to continue to work closely with our Five Eyes partners (US, UK, Australia and New Zealand) and find new ways for the Five Eyes to make a difference through enhanced intelligence sharing, policy dialogue, and foreign policy alignments…
Very solid points indeed. And I think the views I took in this 2020 post are still valid, especially in light of the war in Ukraine:
There’s a lot more involved than the funding announcements, new radar systems and infrastructure that the government has highlighted. In particular the government has said little publicly about various major changes to NORAD’s strategic focuses and operational priorities that the US has been considering. Further to this post,
here are my extracts from a substantial “commentary” at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute think thank by a professor at the University of Manitoba (see end of the quote), one of the few Canadian academics really on top of this subject and its technical ramifications–along with his colleague Andrea Charron:
This commentary by James Fergusson looks at the future of NORAD modernization and the threat posed by new military technologies.
First formally identified as a priority in the 2017 defence white paper, Strong, Secure and Engaged, and three years after NORAD modernization was identified in Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s mandate letter to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, the Trudeau government has finally earmarked funds for North American defence modernization. In the 2021 federal budget, the government did commit by defence standards, a paltry $252 million to “lay the groundwork for North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) modernization and sustain existing continental and Arctic defence capabilities” (Canada 2021). Yet no spending details were provided.
Subsequently, in January 2022, the government awarded a $592 million contract for in-service support of the North Warning System (NWS).[1] In the recent 2022 budget, $6.1 billion over five years was added to the defence budget (Canada 2022b), although the amount committed to NORAD modernization was left unspecified. In June, Defence Minister Anand announced $4.9 billion over six years, and $40 billion over 20 years for modernization with some additional details.[2] A month later on July 21, the Department of National Defence (DND) provided further details on its fact sheet [see here], though this still lacked specificity[emphasis added].
The announcement and subsequent July DND fact sheet raise two areas for evaluation. The first concerns the funding commitments relative to the reality of defence spending in Canada and infrastructure construction in the Canadian Arctic. The second relates to the underlying policy implications, which have not been acknowledged or presented[emphasis added]…
…North America, NORAD and the Arctic NWS in particular are a politically sensitive domestic issue because of longstanding Canadian sovereignty concerns relative to the United States. As such, North American defence cooperation is always liable to the general state of relations between Canada and the United States, which is one of the reasons why Ottawa has preferred NORAD to operate beneath the political radar in Canada[emphasis added].
In this regard, highly negative Canadian attitudes towards the Trump presidency arguably made forward movement politically risky and, as such, one might interpret the 2017 commitment sans detail and money as a political “trial balloon.” Regardless, the election of US President Biden in 2020 changed the political climate overnight. In addition, the Russian invasion of Ukraine eliminated any potential domestic political opposition to NORAD modernization, which one might have expected with charges of “militarizing” the Arctic and “kowtowing” to the Americans…
Of course, building new radar lines or any other NORAD-related Arctic infrastructure is no easy task, with a short construction season, limited maritime transportation capacity and the large distances involved.[9] Alongside this reality, six years is a very short time in the historically lengthy Canadian procurement process with an average closer to 15 years. Assuming that the internal specification of requirements process has been completed for the unspecified first six-year stage, requests for proposals or bids have to be issued, companies need to construct their bids taking into account buy Canadian provisions in terms of industrial and technological benefits, as well as the government’s commitment to significant Indigenous participation. Next, the bids must be evaluated, contracts issued and finally the acquisition and deployment undertaken.[10]Where this all stands today is unknown publicly[emphasis added].
In other words, the likelihood that DND can spend $4.9 billion over six years appears very low[emphasis added]…
…No one can realistically predict the state of the economy over the next year or so, never mind 20 years. And National Defence will not be immune from government fiscal retrenchment or demands to re-direct funds during an economic downturn to other more politically salient economic and social pressures.
Alongside these factors, if history is our guide, the actual final costs of NORAD modernization are likely to exceed significantly $40 billion, especially given the unpredictable costs of acquiring new advanced technologies for the NORAD mission suite as they emerge over the next 20 years[emphasis added]…
…As deterrence by denial is the central underlying strategic rationale for NORAD modernization, demonstrated capabilities and their communication to existing and potential adversaries are important. Furthermore, with modern space-based capabilities, nothing can be truly hidden. In other words, not least of all relative to the transparency and accountability mantra of the government and the magnitude of investment, the government and DND need to be more forthcoming on NORAD modernization. This, in turn, is linked to the unspoken parameters or limits of NORAD modernization in government thinking about Canada’s role in the defence of North America[emphasis added].
As best that can be discerned from DND’s announcements, NORAD modernization is primarily limited to the Arctic approaches and dominated by the NWS replacement, now labelled the Northern Approaches Surveillance System (NASS), supporting infrastructure (forward operating locations) and associated command, control and communication infrastructure. At Trenton, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), in reply to a media question, stated, “for Canada, we are focused upon 10 to 2 o’clock that is why it is so important we are integrated with the US as they cover the other avenues of approaches” (CPAC 2022). Apparently, at least for now, the east and west coasts of Canada (9 to 10, and 2 to 3 o’clock) are solely an American responsibility. What this, in turn, entails in terms of surveillance infrastructure relative to Canadian territory is unspecified[emphasis added].
…Indicative today is the previous NORAD Commander’s emphasis on obtaining Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Although the current Commander, US General Glen VanHerck, has dropped it from the current NORAD lexicon, it remains in play in the United States military generally and is implicitly embedded in his objective to ensure that NORAD has all-domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority for deterrence, defence and warfighting[emphasis added] (NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs 2021).
…Although unclear, the new NASS will likely be located across the Canadian High Arctic. Consideration also needs to be given to developing a radar network at the lower latitudes. If cruise and hypersonic missiles pass over the Arctic line, there exists no significant capability to track them[emphasis added], as internal civilian radars integrated into NORAD after 9/11 lack the capacity. Of course, these radars could be located in the northern continental United States, but no information has been provided.
This, in turn, raises the government’s funding commitment to the active defence or interception side of the deterrence equation. For now, the government is committed only to acquire new short-, medium- and long-range air-to-air missiles for the new F-35 interceptor fleet (a requirement for NORAD and overseas missions). It has also committed to a new air-to-air refuelling fleet to extend the range of the F-35, allowing it to intercept bombers and other aircraft (archers in NORAD parlance) capable of standoff air-launched missiles. Even so, the probability of intercepting the archers is difficult to estimate and depends upon the ratio of bombers (as well as submarines) and missiles to interceptors. The likelihood that all the archers and the missiles (arrows) will be defeated is below 100 percent. No defence is perfect. Besides, striking at the archers close to, if not in, Russian territory implies NORAD acquiring a pre-emptive strike capability, which will likely prove problematic for the Canadian government, which perceives NORAD as a defensive, reactive institution, not an offensive one[emphasis added].
Regardless, NORAD is in the missile defence world, and this raises the issue of whether Canada needs to invest in ground-based point defences (surface-to-air missiles) to protect high-valued targets[emphasis added]. Such targets are twofold: Canadian cities and industrial centres, and military bases. In terms of the latter, this includes the NASS itself and Arctic forward operating locations. Such defences, however, raise the thorny issue of ballistic missile defence, which the defence minister at Trenton stated there was no policy change, but the government would continue to track the issue.
Someday, perhaps, the government will explain its allergy to ballistic missile defence[emphasis added]…
All of these policy implications, conveniently ignored in the NORAD modernization announcements, suggest a major transformation of NORAD is on the horizon[emphasis added, see posts noted below]. In some ways, they are reminiscent of the policy implications of initial Canadian-American air defence cooperation in the 1950s, which led to the creation of NORAD itself as a function of military requirements. In other words, NORAD modernization is much more than new infrastructure. It is about a much broader and deeper NORAD and thus an expanded and new continental defence relationship[emphasis added–heard anything about that from this government?].
If the past is a guide, this will take place with little, if any, Canadian public debate about a “new” NORAD, as the government seeks to avoid the sensitive and feared issue of Canadian sovereignty relative to the United States. Perhaps it would be better if the government and DND go beyond simple funding announcements, as important as they are, to the lay the groundwork for a well-informed public debate…
Certainly, NORAD and DND officials are well aware of the implications of NORAD modernization beyond new infrastructure, as may be the government in previously announcing a defence review[emphasis added]. Unfortunately, like the relative paucity of information and timelines in the funding announcements, both have been silent about the nature and scope of the review. Regardless, time is pressing, and for the foreseeable future North America and Canada will remain vulnerable to the threat posed by the new military technologies, which can affect how both Canada and the United States respond to future international crises overseas…
In effect, the funding commitments are an important first step. Beyond that, the government needs to be more forthcoming to ensure a mature, well-informed debate on North American defence and NORAD[emphasis added]. No longer can government and DND simply ignore North America for long stretches to time. The world has changed, and with it the significance of North American defence. Funding is just the tip of the iceberg.
About the author
James Fergusson is the Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba and Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba. He is the co-author with Andrea Charron of NORAD: In Perpetuity and Beyond. He received his BA (Hons) and MA degrees from the University of Manitoba and his Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia in 1989. He teaches a range of courses in the areas of international relations, foreign and defence policy, and strategic studies. He has published numerous articles on strategic studies, non-proliferation and arms control, the defence industry, and Canadian foreign and defence policy
Other posts on evolving US thinking about NORAD (most recent first):
As Prof. Fergusson says we still have little idea about what our government thinks. Perhaps it is simply avoiding thinking about difficult matters that might well present, er, challenges in terms of public reaction if discussed with any seriousness. Just stick with emphasizing the money spent in Canada, especially with indigenous communities and on high-tech, and jobs.
(Photo at top of the post is from this 2018 news release by the PM’s office: “Prime Minister Justin Trudeau dines with Canadian Troops at the Ādaži Military Base in Latvia”.)
The reality is that PM Trudeau’s government cares about only five things related to the Canadian Armed Forces:
*Disaster assistance
*sexual harassment
*social justice/diversity/inclusion matters
*job-creating procurements (e.g. shipbuilding in Canada, insanely over-costly though it be)
*domestic/diplomatic effects of deployments (e.g. training Ukrainians, “leading” NATO force in Latvia).
As for the military/combat effectiveness side of things this government is, to be kind, seriously uninterested. So good luck regarding a material response to what the new French ambassador just said–excerpts from a story at the National Post:
The problem, in part, is that Canada has grown too reliant on the U.S. and its massive defence machine, the most costly in the world, Michel Miraillet said
Caught up in navel-gazing and living under the protective shield of the United States, Canada has allowed its military presence worldwide to wither over the last decade or so, France’s new ambassador to Ottawa suggested Friday [Oct. 14].
In blunt comments that he said reflected his own personal opinions, Michel Miraillet argued Canada needs to boost its defence capabilities as threats increase from the likes of China, Russia and North Korea [see post noted at the end of this one].
The problem, in part, is that Canada has grown too reliant on the U.S. and its massive defence machine, the most costly in the world, he said during a meeting with National Post’s editorial board.
“It’s always difficult for a country that by its nature is highly protected, with a big guy below who is a big pain in the neck but at the end of the day, well, it works,” said Miraillet. “You’re very French, you’re riding a first-class carriage with a third-class ticket…
“This country in some ways may be too comfortable, too comfortable.”
The ambassador’s remarks were by no means the first time someone from outside this country has criticized Ottawa’s recent defence spending record. U.S. presidents have long urged Canada and other lagging members of NATO to meet the alliance’s recommended goal of allocating two per cent of GDP to the military.
After reaching a high point in 1993, when over 3,300 Canadians were deployed on peacekeeping missions, the number dwindled to just 54 this year, figures compiled by Royal Military College Prof. Walter Dorn indicate…
Instead of looking beyond its borders at security threats and humanitarian needs worldwide, Canada seems consumed by internal political discussions, especially over “gender” issues, said Miraillet.
“Now I have this sentiment — this is very personal — but the country is really belly-button focused, more than ever.”..
No merde, Maigret. Two tweets from Prof. Thomas Juneau, very well-versed in Canadian defence and national security matters:
Some condemn the French ambassador's "undiplomatic" language calling out Canada. I disagree: Canada takes foreign policy seriously only in response to crisis or intense public pressure (see, Iran now). Allies, all irritated by Canada's free riding, *should* publicly criticize us. https://t.co/qpTp4t2PWU
The commander of the Canadian Armed Forces is calling on the country to rally behind its military as it faces an unprecedented personnel crisis that he says is threatening its ability to protect and defend Canada.
“We’re here to defend our way of life, now and into the future,” chief of the defence staff Gen. Wayne Eyre said. “So we need a whole-of-society effort to help us bring the Armed Forces back to where it needs to be for the dangerous world ahead.”
The extraordinary appeal comes as Eyre and his subordinates are struggling to fill around 10,000 empty positions at a time when Canada’s military is facing a growing number of threats and requests for help at home and abroad.
Earlier this month, the defence chief issued an order setting a new direction for the military after years of high-tempo deployments and operations, making recruitment and retention of personnel its top priority…
Finally that recent post mentioned earlier (see also “Comments”)–it really is unusual for senior Canadian officers (unlike American, and increasingly British, ones) to go public with such major concerns over broad national security/foreign policy matters. The CDS must really be approaching despair. With good reason.
UPDATE: Very big picture from CDS Gen. Eyre in video:
This interview of the CDS on 2 November by one of Washington's preeminent think tanks @CSIS is one of the most informative interviews to date.https://t.co/zj8NdTMISX
(Caption for photo at top of the post: “Acting [now no longer acting] Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre arrives on Parliament Hill prior to a cabinet meeting in Ottawa on Tuesday, Nov. 23, 2021. Photo by Sean Kilpatrick/THE CANADIAN PRESS”.)
This is not the way PM Trudeau’s government likes to talk about the PRC (Russia is quite another matter, what with the invasion of Ukraine and all), with which it still lusts for good ties in order to make big bucks.
This May foreign minister Joly said “she’s focused on rebuilding Ottawa’s damaged relations with Beijing” (the Two Michaels and all that) and said “she will release the Trudeau government’s long-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy in the ‘coming weeks.'”
Then in August it was reported that “The government has been quietly formulating its Indo-Pacific strategy since 2020. Two sources with knowledge of the strategy said the first draft, which was compiled by a team from Global Affairs [the sexy new name for the foreign ministry], made no mention of China [!!!].”
And at the end of September we read that the strategy will be out later this year, following the CCP’s 20th National Congress in the middle of October (Xi forever, eh?).
So this from the Chief of the Defence Staff seems to go well beyond the government’s slowly, slowly, very cautious approach to Beijing–if not Moscow these days:
Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Wayne Eyre, told MPs that Russia and China consider themselves to be at war with the West and Canada must rise to meet this challenge.
Eyre was meeting with MPs at the Commons standing committee on national security to talk about the threat Russia poses to Canada.
He said Russia and China don’t differentiate between peace and war and are actively seeking to challenge the West.
“Russia and China are not just looking at regime survival but regime expansion. They consider themselves to be at war with the West,” he said. “They strive to destroy the social cohesion of liberal democracies and the credibility of our own institutions to ensure our model of government is seen as a failure.”..
Eyre declined to say whether the government should be spending more on defence, but said they unquestionably are facing a new environment in the future and Canada is not ready for it.
“I am concerned that as the threats to the world’s security situation increase, the threats at home increase, our readiness is going down,” he said. “The military that we have today is not the military that we need for the threats that are occurring in the future.” [See this post two days ago, and “Comments”: “Emergency Response: Do Canadians Want a Combat-Capable Army? (note UPPERDATE)“.]
one suspects that for many people the answer would be no or don’t care, especially among the progressive elements and such political parties. After all, helping those in distress engenders that warm and fuzzy feeling.
As the navy and air force tend not to be so heavily involved in emergency activities the problems outlined below do not affect those service so heavily. At the National Post (Dick Fadden in my view is one of our best public servants of this millenium);
With the increasing number of domestic natural disasters expected to rise, a former Canadian security adviser said prime ministers need access to more relief options than simply deploying the military.
Testifying before the House committee on national defence, former national security adviser Richard Fadden said the days of relying on the military as the country’s sole response to large-scale disasters are over.
“The past practice of the CF (Canadian Forces) assisting in domestic disasters … should be left aside,” he told committee members.
“These practices may or may not have been appropriate for the time, but the environment today is different.”
With over 700 troops currently assisting with hurricane cleanup in Atlantic Canada, questions about whether the military is still the best option for such disasters have been swirling around Parliament Hill.
“This is a really large country, and moving emergency supplies across the country is something the Canadian Forces can do,” Fadden said…
Prior to his retirement in 2016, Fadden served as national security adviser for prime ministers Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau.
He was also director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) from 2009 to 2013, and deputy defence minister from 2013 to 2015.
Fadden said officials should consider both the domestic and international priorities of our military in determining if a military response is warranted in times of domestic crisis — or even practical.
Testifying Sept. 27 in front of the same committee, Maj-Gen. Paul Prévost said the military was deployed to seven natural disasters just in the past 12 months — including wildfires across western Canada and Ontario, Iqaluit’s fuel-tainted drinking water emergency, and floods in Yukon, B.C. and Newfoundland.
Prevost told the committee that Canada should consider CAF a rescue squad of “last resort.” [See this story: “As the East Coast picks up the pieces post-Fiona, MPs ask themselves what an army is for”.]
Speaking before the same committee, Fadden said the definition of “last” is being used rather loosely[emphasis added].
“It’s becoming too easy for prime ministers, not in particular this one, but prime ministers generally to simply say, ‘I’m going to send in the army,’” he said.
“We do this without talking to the provinces, municipalities and civil society about what they could and should do.”
Speaking to CBC News over the weekend, Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre said forming a new CAF branch specifically to respond to disaster relief was beyond his organization’s capabilities[emphasis added, see this story: “Facing foreign conflicts, domestic disasters, Canada’s top soldier worries about readiness”].
Fadden agreed.
“The Canadian Forces, right now, are under all sorts of pressures, they’re not doing as well as they can,” Fadden said.
“Adding another function, another organization to the portfolio, I think, would be a real mistake.”
With the number of emergencies and disasters expected to increase, Fadden said rethinking how Canada deploys its military should be a given.
“The last four or five years have demonstrated this in spades,” he said.
Fadden said it’s important to consider what he described as “unity of function” when determining Canadian military policy.
“Asking the Canadian Forces, for example, to run a railway would be a mistake,” he said.
“Asking the Canadian Forces to become overly involved in disaster assistance, in my view, is also a mistake.”
Late last month, Defence officials described Canadian military recruitment shortfalls as a “crisis[emphasis added],” despite plans by the Liberal government to bolster personnel numbers.
Earlier this year, numbers from the Department of National Defence indicated Canada was short around 12,000 members of our full operational strength of 100,000 troops [the goal is around 70,000 regular forces and 30,000 reserves, mainly army–see this recent story: “Military sounding alarm over recruiting problems as Canadians steer clear”].
By the end of 2020, CAF was short only around 7,000 troops…
As for next steps, Fadden said future emergency response needs to be weighed against logistical, administrative and manpower challenges.
Giving government officials more tools than simply deploying the army should be key, he said.
“If a prime minister only has one tool in the context of dealing with disasters, it’s a problem.”
He [Dick Fadden] said domestic emergency operations — such as cleaning up after storms and fighting forest fires — distract the military from the training it needs in an increasingly unstable world — a point the Conservatives have been hammering away on since the committee launched its study.
That doesn’t mean the Armed Forces should stay away when Canadians are struck by tragedies like post-tropical storm Fiona, Fadden said.
Sending in the army has become ‘too easy’ — Fadden
The problem, he added, is that in recent years the federal government has acted as if the military is the only tool it can turn to in a disaster…
Fadden argued that the problem cannot be examined with a narrow focus on military response. He called on the federal government to undertake a thorough, independent review of all emergency response capacity across the country, both federal and provincial[emphasis added].
Last week, a senior military commander told the committee that the number of requests for assistance the Armed Forces receives from provinces has ramped up rapidly over the past decade[emphasis added].
Maj.-Gen. Paul Prevost testified that in 2021, there were seven such requests for a military response to provincial emergencies — floods, forest fires and other natural disasters. The period between 2017 and 2021 saw an average of four such requests per year. From 2010 to 2017, the average was two per year.
Those numbers do not include the 118 calls for assistance the military answered during the pandemic by, for example, backstopping exhausted health care staff in long-term care homes in Ontario and Quebec [see photo below post noted at start of this one]…
Fadden argued that disaster response robs the military of time it should spend training for international commitments during a period of heightened international tensions…
“I am not a military person but I don’t think you need to be … the chief of the defence staff or the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs to realize that there is not enough operational training, there are not enough exercises right now,” he told MPs.
“It is short of criminal to send our troops into potentially harm’s way if they’re not as trained as we can possibly make them. I don’t think they’re doing enough [training] today. And if they’re chopping wood — which they may well need to do and do other things to fight forest fires and whatnot — they’re not doing operational training. [emphasis added]“
It’s the kind of talk that makes provincial government officials squirm in their seats…
Indeed. No level of government really want to pay much consistent attention to emergency preparedness and response, much less spend money on specific resources/assets to deal with them. So just rely on the forces if things get bad. And if those forces are too small and already overstretched?
UPDATE: I imagine this as close to combat as people are willing to see our troops. But they still need a lot of good, serious, training to do this job well:
#CAF members from 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry are in the United Kingdom instructing and mentoring Ukrainian Armed Forces members during live fire ranges as part of #OpUNIFIER. 📸 Corporal Eric Greico, Canadian Armed Forces Photo pic.twitter.com/JfN3yklecu
…dramatic action is needed to ensure the military has the troops it needs to respond to growing demands and threats at home and abroad…
The new approach won’t come without risks, which Eyre acknowledged in directing a reduction of large-scale training exercises in favour of more individualized classes as the military focuses on getting enough troops with basic skills into the ranks.
While military commanders have previously underscored the importance of large-scale exercises, the order says Eyre “will be ready to accept the associated reduction in readiness levels using a risk-based approach[emphasis added].”..
The Armed Forces is supposed to be adding about 5,000 troops to the regular and reserve forces to meet a growing list of demands, but is instead short more than 10,000 trained members.https://t.co/Yv3A8Ikvzl
Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland says she “already” has a “really big job” but did not deny rumours that she could be in the running to become the next secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Asked if she was considering a run for the top job at NATO during a brief press conference Wednesday [Sept. 7], Freeland neither confirmed nor denied her interest, but rather explained that she loves her current post.
“So, I have a really big job already. In fact, I have two big jobs as finance minister and deputy prime minister of Canada,” she told reporters in Vancouver, B.C., where Liberals are hosting a cabinet retreat…
Rumours of Freeland, the government’s second most important cabinet member after Justin Trudeau, being a candidate for the top job at NATO have swirled amongst NATO watchers for weeks but were first reported by Paul Wells in his newsletter earlier this week.
Current NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s term was set to end at the end of the month but was extended by one year last March due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February.
That means that his replacement would only start in October 2023, over one year from now.
Freeland’s name has also swirled as a possible replacement as head of the Liberal Party of Canada when Trudeau eventually steps down…
According to NATO’s website, the secretary general position has “traditionally” been held by a senior European politician that is chosen by consensus decision by its 30 member states. A Canadian has never held the role…
Political scientist and Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University Stephen Saideman said that he’d also heard rumours of Freeland aiming for the top NATO job recently. He also agreed with [Christian] Leuprecht [professor at both the Royal Military College and Queen’s University] that the odds Canada gets the consensus vote for her are slim…
That’s in part because Canada has never lived up to its NATO commitment of dedicating two per cent of GDP to defence expenditures. In 2021, the country spent approximately 1.4 per cent of GDP on the military and would have to commit an additional $75.3 billion before the end of 2027, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer.
“I find it challenging to suggest she is a shoo-in for this, given she’s deputy prime minister from a country that has underperformed on a key NATO metric,” Saideman said.
Leuprecht says the state of Canada’s military and the country’s inability to go through with major defence procurement projects (such as new fighter jets) is also likely to play against Canada when it comes to heading one of the biggest defence alliances in the world.
“This government constantly politicizes everything about the military,” Leuprecht said. “You have a military that is currently 12,000 positions short of operational. If you can’t keep your own organization staffed and equipped, if I was another NATO country, I’d say ‘Come back when you can show that you can make a decision and actually buy stuff… and at least staff that military properly.’”
To my mind, given Canadian defence realities, it would be awfully arrogant and unselfconscious for a Canadian government to put her name forward. Rank chutzpah. Just being of Ukrainian origin and really anti-Russian is not enough to make the case for Ms Freeland (see this 2021 story: “KGB archives show how Chrystia Freeland drew the ire (and respect) of Soviet intelligence services”).
it has now been made clear that the spending over the next six years is not in fact new money but funds previously allocated. So much for all that pressure from the Biden administration, see this April post:
Here’s a finally released official “Fact Sheet” (the big general announcement was made June 20); details are not provided about where specific amounts of spending on various projects are supposed to go and when:
In June 2022, the Minister of National Defence announced funding for Canada’s continental defence capabilities, including to modernize the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). This represents the most significant upgrade to Canada’s NORAD capabilities in almost four decades.
NORAD modernization is a long term project and these funds will support NORAD and the Canadian Armed Forces’ ability to protect Canadians against new and emerging military threats to Canada and North America more broadly. In so doing, they will also help support the Canadian Armed Forces’ engagement abroad, while reinforcing NATO’s Western flank at a time when autocratic regimes [WHICH ONES, FOR PITY’S SAKE? the threat that dare not speak its name] are threatening the rules-based international order.
The minister announced $4.9B on a cash basis for the first six years, and $38.6B over twenty years on an accrual basis.
The incremental funding for the first six years of NORAD modernization comes from existing, previously announced funding [emphasis added]. Planning for NORAD modernization has been underway for several years, and the Government of Canada previously announced funding for elements of continental defence and NORAD modernization in Budget 2022, as well as defence funding in Fall Economic Statement 2020.
The most recent NORAD modernization announcement provides new funding beginning after year six (in year seven [emphasis added–well down the road, nothing sure then).
Specific investments will include, among other initiatives, new radar stations, command and control upgrades, additional air-to-air refueling aircraft, advanced air-to-air missiles for fighter jets, upgrades to Canadian Armed Forces’ infrastructure in the North, and additional funding to complete and augment key space projects.
The funding for continental defence and NORAD modernization is broken down into five inter-related areas of investment, detailed below.
In Detail: New Investments in Continental Defence and NORAD Modernization
This $38.6 billion on an accrual basis of funding for continental defence and NORAD modernization is broken down into five inter-related areas of investment:
Bolstering our ability to detect threats earlier and more precisely by modernizing our surveillance systems.
Improving our ability to understand and communicate threats to decision-makers in a timely manner through investments in modern technology.
Strengthening our ability to deter and defeat aerospace threats by modernizing our air weapons systems.
Ensuring the Canadian Armed Forces can sustain a strong military presence across the country, including in Canada’s North, through investments in new infrastructure and support capabilities.
Future-proofing our capabilities to defend North America through investments in science and technology.
Areas of investment
Investments
1. Bolstering our ability to detect threats earlier and more precisely by modernizing our surveillance systems. $6.96B from fiscal year 22/23 – 41/42
We will establish a new Northern Approaches Surveillance system to significantly expand NORAD and Canadian Armed Forces situational awareness of objects entering Canadian airspace from the North. This will represent a dramatic improvement over Canada’s existing 30-year old North Warning System, which was not designed to detect modern weapons and delivery systems, such as long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles. It will include: An Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar system to provide early warning radar coverage and threat tracking from the Canada-United States border to the Arctic circle; A Polar Over-the-Horizon Radar system to provide early warning radar coverage over and beyond the northernmost approaches to North America, including the Canadian Arctic archipelago; and National Defence will also work with the United States to develop a complementary network of sensors with classified capabilities, distributed across Northern Canada, as another layer of detection. We will also strengthen the Canadian Armed Forces’ space-based surveillance abilities, including of Canadian territory and maritime approaches, by investing additional funds to complete and augment the new state-of-the-art, space-based surveillance project announced in Canada’s 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) [document here].
2. Improving our ability to understand and communicate threats to decision-makers in a timely manner through investments in modern technology. $4.13B from fiscal year 22/23 – 41/42
We will modernize key Canadian Armed Forces’ command, control and communications capabilities and systems. We will modernize the Canadian Combined Air Operations Centre. We will renew the Canadian Armed Forces’ high and low-frequency radio capability. We will enhance satellite communications in the Arctic through additional funding to complete and augment the polar communications project [emphasis added] announced in SSE. We will procure and install new digital radios and network equipment. We will also work with the United States to expand support for the NORAD Pathfinder initiative. This project will take advantage of cloud-based computing and machine learning to ensure that NORAD commanders can make informed, rapid decisions. We will also advance work on a new Positioning, Navigation, and Timing capability to assist with air navigation in remote areas.
3. Strengthening our ability to deter and defeat aerospace threats by modernizing our air weapons systems. $6.38B from fiscal year 22/23 – 41/42
We will procure new, advanced air-to-air missiles with the capability to engage threats from short, medium and long-ranges [almost certainly including the latest Raytheon A-120 AMRAAM, for the F-35As the RCAF is supposed to be getting].
4. Ensuring our Canadian Armed Forces can launch and sustain a strong military presence across the country, including in Canada’s North, through investments in new infrastructure and support capabilities. $15.68B from fiscal year 22/23 – 41/42
We will acquire additional air-to-air refueling aircraft [Airbus A330MRTTs, at least some converted from previously owned commercial planes, six planned total–good choice]. We will upgrade Canadian Armed Forces’ infrastructure at four locations in Canada’s North. We will upgrade fighter infrastructure and NORAD Quick Reaction Alert capabilities at bases across Canada. We will modernize the Canadian Armed Forces’ air operational training infrastructure.
5. Future-proofing our capabilities to defend North America through investments in science and technology. $4.23B from fiscal year 22/23 – 41/42
We will fund Defence Research and Development Canada [website here] to create a science and technology program that will assess new and emerging threats, accessing and co-developing technological solutions with the United States.
The $38.6 billion investment also includes $1.18 billion for internal services.
Note: Figures may not add due to rounding.
Definitions
Accrual basis of accounting Under the accrual basis of accounting, the cost of acquiring an asset is recorded when the asset is put into service and spread over its useful life, rather than being recorded at the time the bills are paid. The portion of DND’s accrual budget records the forecasted depreciation expense of capital assets, like equipment and infrastructure. Cash basis of accounting Under the cash basis of accounting, payments related to capital assets and operational funding are recorded in the year during which payments are made. Each year, DND receives a cash appropriation from Parliament and these funds are used to cover salaries, operating and maintenance costs, grants and contributions, purchase of capital equipment, and the construction of real property infrastructure. The cash budget is approved through the Main Estimates and can be revised up to three times per year through Supplementary Estimates.”
My comments.
Note that by far the largest single chunk of planned expenditures (Airbus tanker/transports aside) is intended for infrastructure of various sorts. In other words lots of Jobs! Jobs! Jobs!, especially up north–section 4.: “strong military presence across the country”.
And if you believe any government’s twenty-year plans will actually happen I’ve got an island in the Canadian arctic to sell you to put a radar site on.
By the way national defence minister’s June 20 speech made mention of ground-based air defence; but that is absent in the fact sheet above. From the post noted at the start of this one:
Thirdly, we will acquire new defensive capabilities to deter and, if necessary, to overcome aerospace threats...
We will also work on developing options for a Canadian ground-based air defence capability [emphasis added]...”
Presumably that ground-based air defence capability will be missiles capable of intercepting cruise missiles closing on their targets. Will they be placed to defend our fighter bases at Cold Lake, Alberta and Bagotville, Quebec? Critical infrastructure such as ports? Nuclear power plants? Major cities in case of a possible demonstration nuclear attack (a 2016 post: “NORAD and Russian Cruise Nukes: “de-escalation”? Part 2“)?
A friend has just noted:
There’s no way they’re spending 6+ billion$ just on AMRAAMs. That might be where the GBAD [ground-based air defence] stuff is conveniently rolled up in [section 3.].
(Caption for photo at top of the post: “Army recruiters speaking to shoppers in a Walmart in Colorado Springs. Military recruiters visit shopping centers to look for young people who might consider enlisting. Credit…Michael Ciaglo for The New York Times”.)
The pool, and willingness, to serve, keep shrinking–extracts from a NY Times’ story (many photos at original):
Fighting headwinds from the pandemic, the tight labor market and demographic shifts, the armed forces may fall further short of enlistment quotas this year than they have in decades.
FOUNTAIN, Colo. — The local Army recruiting station was empty. The normally reliable recruiting grounds at the nearby Walmart were a bust. With the Army still thousands of soldiers short of its recruiting goal, the station commander, Sgt. First Class James Pulliam, dressed head to toe in camouflage, scanned a strip-mall parking lot for targets.
He spotted a young woman getting out of a car, and put on his best salesman smile.
“Hey, how’d you know I was going to be here today!” the sergeant said with an affable Carolina drawl, as if greeting an old friend. “I’m going to help put you in the Army!”
These are tough times for military recruiting. Almost across the board, the armed forces are experiencing large shortfalls in enlistments this year — a deficit of thousands of entry-level troops that is on pace to be worse than any since just after the Vietnam War. It threatens to throw a wrench into the military’s machinery, leaving critical jobs unfilled and some platoons with too few people to function.
Covid-19 is part of the problem. Lockdowns during the pandemic have limited recruiters’ ability to forge bonds face to face with prospects. And the military’s vaccine mandate has kept some would-be troops away.The current white-hot labor market, with many more jobs available than people to fill them, is also a factor, as rising civilian wages and benefits make military service less enticing.
But longer-term demographic trends are also taking a toll. Less than a quarter of young American adults are physically fit to enlist and have no disqualifying criminal record, a proportion that has shrunk steadily in recent years. And shifting attitudes toward military service mean that now only about one in 10 young people say they would even consider it[emphasis added].
To try to counter those forces, the military has pushed enlistment bonuses as high as $50,000, and is offering “quick ship” cash of up to $35,000 for certain recruits who can leave for basic training in 30 days. To broaden the recruiting pool, the service branches have loosened their restrictions on neck tattoos and other standards. In June, the Army even briefly dropped its requirement for a high school diploma, before deciding that was a bad move and rescinding the change.
The Army is the largest of the armed forces, and the recruiting shortfall is hitting it the hardest[emphasis added]. As of late June, it had recruited only about 40 percent of the roughly 57,000 new soldiers it wants to put in boots by Sept. 30, the end of the fiscal year…
The young woman in the strip-mall parking lot was on her way to get a pizza, and looked confused when the tall man in green began pitching her on the benefits of serving her country. She eventually apologized politely and said she could not join up, gesturing to an insulin pump clipped to her shorts.
The sergeant made a mental note: diabetic, not fit to serve. But he did not give up.
“OK, well, just give me a name — one number I can call, right now,” he pressed. “You’ve got to know someone who might want to join. One number, and I’ll leave you alone.”
Seconds later, he was on the phone with one of the woman’s friends. “She says you want to join the Army,” the sergeant said, as if he were announcing the winning Powerball numbers. “Where you work? I can meet you when you get done.”
The sergeant paused, turned and said, “Dude just hung up on me!”
…The Navy and Marine Corps do not release recruiting figures before the end of the fiscal year, a spokesman said, but both have acknowledged that it will be hard for them to meet quotas this year.
Even the Air Force, which has rarely had trouble attracting talent in the past, is about 4,000 recruits short of the level it typically reaches by midsummer…
A modest recruiting bump from snappy ads the service ran before screenings of “Top Gun: Maverick” helped a bit..
When civilian jobs are plentiful, as they are now, the military tries to compete using two tactics: Sweetening the deal with signing bonuses, better pay and other enticements, and lowering standards a bit to enlist people who might not otherwise qualify.
The military has also adapted by downsizing. The number of active-duty service members is now about half of what it was in the 1980s, and is projected to keep decreasing[emphasis added].
…the armed forces [has become] something of a family business, and led to some communities, many of them in the Southeast, supplying a disproportionate share of recruits. But even in those kinds of communities, recruiting has been tough this year.’..
UPDATE:
The Army's recruiting challenges this year continue as senior U.S. Army officials acknowledge to Congress that the total size of the active-duty arm of the branch will be 10,000 soldiers fewer than had been anticipated. https://t.co/CGigCxQAah
The directive noted the need for reconstitution of the armed forces because of the ongoing problems the military has had attracting new recruits and retaining skilled personnel. The pandemic has significantly reduced recruiting and the failure by military leaders to take care of their personnel has led to retention problems. The sexual misconduct crisis, which has once again engulfed the Canadian Forces, has also harmed retention and recruitment, according to the directive [see 2) below]…
A report by a former Supreme Court justice released Monday [May 30] offers recommendations to turn around pervasive sexual assault and harassment.Several of Canada’s top military officers have been accused of sexual harassment, and the former top commander pleaded guilty this year to criminal charges related to accusations that he committed sexual misconduct when leading the nation’s armed forces.
About a quarter of the women serving in the Canadian military said they had been sexually assaulted during their military careers, according to a government census. And the government has set aside nearly $800 million to settle class action lawsuits by current and former military members involving sexual misconduct.
The cascade of sexual abuse scandals has shaken confidence in the military in Canada, where on Monday the government released an independent review by a former Supreme Court justice aimed at addressing what critics say is a pervasive and systemic problem that has persisted despite past promises of reform…
3) At the Legion magazine (of the Royal Canadian Legion, veterans):
Anxious to attract increasingly reticent recruits and bring dated policies more in line with evolving societal norms, the Canadian Armed Forces have announced new dress codes, with an emphasis on being gender-neutral.That means traditional short hair is out—unless you prefer it that way. Soldiers, sailors and aircrew can now grow their manes as long and in whatever colour they want, provided they don’t cover their faces or impede operational performance…
Military personnel of all genders can also now sport tattoos, wear most piercings, apply cosmetics, fashion false nails and choose whatever military clothing suits their taste—except where it’s operationally unsafe. The primary other restrictions under the new dress regulations apply to formal ceremonies, for which parade commanders will continue to dictate what’s acceptable…
Brave new world for Canadian service personnel. But if you change it will they come?
UPDATE: Very interesting threat by serving Canadian Army officer:
This was a tongue in cheek jab at the silly "Army's too woke now" claims, but the reality is that both the US and Canadian military are encountering significant challenges in recruiting – a complex topic into which we readily project our own biases. A 🧵on CAF recruiting… https://t.co/kCMgn5ztWN
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