EPAExperts told the BBC that any weapon could cause chaos for the satellite reliant US (file image)
Russia is developing a “troubling” new anti-satellite weapon, the US has said, but it emphasised that Moscow has yet to deploy it.
White House spokesperson John Kirby made the comments a day after a senior House Republican issued vague warnings of a “serious national security threat”.
The weapon is space-based and armed with a nuclear weapon to target satellites, the BBC’s US partner CBS News reported.
But Mr Kirby did not confirm this and refused to offer precise details on the threat on Thursday.
Moscow accused the US of using claims of new Russian weapons as a ruse to force Congress to pass additional Ukraine aid by “hook or by crook”.
Mr Kirby, who was recently made a top aide to President Joe Biden, told reporters that there is no immediate threat to the US public.
“We’re not talking about a weapon that can be used to attack human beings. or cause physical destruction, here on Earth,” he said.
President Biden was briefed on the intelligence, Mr Kirby said, and that his administration was taking the development of the weapon “very seriously”. He added that the president had already ordered “direct diplomatic engagement with Russia” over the threat.
House Intelligence Committee chairman Mike Turner issued a cryptic warning about a serious national security threat on Wednesday, sparking a flurry of rumours around the capital.
On Thursday, Mr Turner and others from the committee met with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to discuss the matter further.
“We all came away with a very strong impression that the administration is taking this very seriously and that the administration has a plan in place,” Mr Turner said following the meeting. “We look forward to supporting them as they go to implement it.”
While space weapons sound ripped from the pages of science fiction novels or films such as Superman II and James Bond’s GoldenEye, military experts have long warned that space is likely to be the next frontier of warfare in an increasingly technology-dependent world.
What do we know about the threat?
Other than Mr Kirby’s comments, US government officials have yet to publicly reveal any specific details about the threat.
National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan suggested the silence is intentional, telling reporters on Wednesday that the US must prioritise the “sources and methods” its security agencies used to collect intelligence about the threat.
The New York Times, ABC and CBS reported that the threat was related to Russia developing a nuclear-capable weapon that could be used to strike US satellites in space.
Mr Kirby told reporters that there is no evidence that the weapon has been deployed, but emphasised that the US is taking the threat “very seriously”.
For years, US officials and aerospace experts have warned that Russia and China have been steadily developing military capabilities in space as they seek to catch up to the US.
A report released by the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies last year suggested that Russia is developing a range of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, including a missile that was successfully tested against a defunct Soviet-era satellite in November 2021.
One of the report’s authors, former top Pentagon intelligence official Kari Bingen, told the BBC that during its war in Ukraine, Russia has already used a variety of other methods – such as cyber attacks and jamming – to hamper satellite communications.
“That is already a part of their warfighting doctrine,” she said.
Should the public be worried?
Senior lawmakers – including House Speaker Mike Johnson – have said that there is no need for public alarm.
Mike Turner has also come under some criticism for announcing the threat, with fellow Republican Andy Ogles accusing him of a “reckless disregard” for the “well-being and psyche of the American people”.
Experts and former officials, however, have warned that any threat to US satellites could have a far-reaching impact.
More so than any of its potential global adversaries, the US military is heavily dependent on satellite communications for everything from surveillance and missile launch detection to navigation at sea and in the air, GPS-guided bombs and battlefield communications.
Getty ImagesThe US military is heavily dependent on satellites for everything from navigation to targeting.
“Our military, the way our military fights today and the investment in weapons that we make is all contingent on space capabilities,” added Ms Bingen, who was the second-highest ranking intelligence official in the US department of defence. “Without that, we would be in a pretty tough situation. We could not fight the way we’ve learned to fight over the last 30 or 40 years.”
The dependence on satellites is also evident in the civilian world, where satellites are used for a wide range of everyday functions from GPS-enabled ride-hailing services and food delivery to weather forecasting, precision agriculture and financial transactions that rely on satellite-based time signals.
“Satellites are integral to our daily lives,” Ms Bingen added. “Americans, and citizens across the globe, rely on space and don’t even really know about it.”
Are there any rules about space weapons?
The US, Russia and China already have the capability to attack satellites around the world. But, in theory, they cannot use nuclear weapons there.
All three are signatories of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which forbids countries from sending into orbit “any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction”.
Mick Mulroy, a former US deputy assistant secretary of defence, said that the treaty provides no guarantee of safety in the current geopolitical climate.
“Russia has shown a complete disregard for the treaties it has signed and has shown a willingness to use military force in Ukraine, counter to all international laws and norms,” he said. “They do not keep to their word or stick to their treaty obligations.”
Getty ImagesThe US Space Force formally became a branch of the US military in December 2019.
Will space be the new battlefield?
Matthew Kroenig, a commissioner on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and a former defence and intelligence official during the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations, told the BBC that it is natural that space has become an increasingly important focus of militaries around the world.
“Up until this point, humans have kind of been exploring space,” he said. “But we’re now entering a phase where we’re seeing the commercialisation of space, and we’re just at the beginning.”
The next phase, he added, will see countries around the globe focus on “securing” space.
“We kind of take it for granted that the seas and the skies are free and open for commercial activity,” Mr Kroenig said. “Ideally, that’s where we would want space to be 30 years from now, traveling, doing business, and maybe even living in space,”
“We need to make sure that’s a safe, secure domain.”
A Times visual analysis found that a rocket launched from Gaza on Oct. 7 hit an Israeli military base believed to house nuclear-capable missiles, although it’s likely they were not in danger
Satellite imagery taken before and after an Oct. 7 rocket strike showed the sudden appearance of scorched earth at the Sdot Micha military base in central Israel.CreditCredit…The New York Times, Source: Planet Labs
Dec. 4, 2023Updated 12:25 p.m. ET
A rocket most likely fired by Hamas militants during their Oct. 7 attack on Israel struck an Israeli military base where, experts say, many of the country’s nuclear-capable missiles are based, according to a visual analysis of the attack’s aftermath by The New York Times.
While the missiles themselves weren’t hit, the rocket’s impact, at the Sdot Micha base in central Israel, sparked a fire that approached missile storage facilities and other sensitive weaponry.
Israel has never acknowledged the existence of its nuclear arsenal, though Israeli whistle-blowers, U.S. officials and satellite imagery analysts all agree that the country possesses at least a small number of nuclear weapons.
Hans Kristensen, director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project, told The Times that he estimates there are most likely 25 to 50 nuclear-capable Jericho missile launchers at the base. According to experts and declassified U.S. government documents, Israel’s Jericho missiles are equipped to carry nuclear warheads.
Those warheads are most likely kept in a separate location away from the base and thus were not under threat during the attack, said Mr. Kristensen, who has studied the base.
The previously unreported strike on Sdot Micha is the first known instance of Palestinian militants hitting a site suspected of containing Israeli nuclear weaponry. It’s unclear if they knew the specifics of what they were targeting, beyond the base simply being a military facility. Hamas, the group that fired the majority of the rockets on Oct. 7, did not respond to requests for comment.
But the targeting of one of the most sensitive military locations in Israel shows that the scope of the Oct. 7 attacks may have been even greater than previously known — and that rockets can penetrate the airspace around Israel’s closely guarded strategic weapons.
The attack on the area around Sdot Micha involved a series of rockets over several hours, according to warning alarm data. It’s unclear how many rockets were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system, or managed to slip through and hit the base in addition to the one found by The Times. In some cases around the country on Oct. 7, Iron Dome became overwhelmed by the amount of incoming fire or ran out of interceptor missiles.
A spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces declined to comment on The Times’s findings. Since Oct. 7, though, Israel appears to have recognized and responded to the threat of rocket attacks at Sdot Micha. Recent satellite images show new earthen berms and barriers have been built around military positions near the rocket impact location, presumably to defend against shrapnel or blast debris from future attacks.
The Times first identified the fire caused by the attack on Sdot Micha using public NASA satellite imagery for detecting wildfires. There has not been a fire — from any cause — of similar magnitude at the base since at least 2004.
Further evidence of the attack exists in publicly available satellite imagery, rocket alarm records and social media posts, which also revealed efforts to fight the brush fire ignited by the fallen rocket.
The rocket struck within the confines of the base, located 25 miles northeast of Gaza and 15 miles west of Jerusalem, at around 10 a.m. It landed in a small ravine adjacent to a Jericho missile facility, a large radar system and a battery of air defense missiles. The explosion quickly started a fire in the thick, dry vegetation.
While The Times could not confirm if other rockets also struck the base, satellite imagery captured at 10:30 a.m. shows the fire near the Jericho missiles was the only one on the base.
More satellite images taken in the hours after the strike captured the rapid spread of the fire and Israeli firefighters’ efforts to stem its growth. At least two firefighting aircraft and streaks of bright red fire retardant were visible near the fire. The next day, a satellite image revealed that new roads and firebreaks had been cut through the woods to contain the flames, which appeared to be extinguished.
Decker Eveleth, a researcher at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies who analyzed the images, said it appeared that “paths were created by firefighting vehicles making sure the fire didn’t get near the launchers.”
According to a University of Maryland database tracking attacks on nuclear facilities, there have been only about five known strikes worldwide on bases with nuclear weapons in the past. But because of the inherent secrecy of nuclear weapons, the exact number may never be publicly known. However, Gary Ackerman, one of the researchers who established the database, said the Oct. 7 attack was unique. “This is not something that happens every day,” he said.
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Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups typically fire rockets at Israeli towns and cities relatively close to Gaza. Indeed, they fired thousands of projectiles at these locations on Oct. 7. On the rarer occasions that the groups fire longer-range rockets, they usually target Israeli cities farther from Gaza like Tel Aviv and Rishon LeZion rather than the military bases storing advanced weaponry that, in some cases, are much closer to Gaza.
The Sdot Micha base, in existence since 1962 and clearly visible on public satellite imagery, occupies thousands of acres of rolling hills. While rockets fired by militants in the Gaza Strip can be inaccurate, it is unlikely Sdot Micha was hit by accident. There are virtually no other targets — besides sensitive military facilities — within two miles of the rocket’s impact site. There are also few important, nonmilitary targets in the greater region as a whole because of its sparse population.
Though the fire burned approximately 40 acres at the base, weaponry and equipment remained safe. The flames stopped about 1,000 feet from the nearest suspected Jericho missile facility, but approached within 400 feet of a large radar system built on a hill at the base, according to a Times analysis of satellite imagery.
Mr. Kristensen observed that, even if the fire had reached the missiles, their underground, tunneled storage facilities were built to withstand damage. Still, he noted the risks inherent in a fire of this size burning near volatile fuel and munition depots. “All sorts of things can go wrong,” he said.
Alexander Cardia and Scott Reinhard contributed production.
The way countries view nuclear weapons is shifting. As past arms control measures have ended or decayed, the United States, Russia, and China are investing heavily (again) in their nuclear arsenals, pursuing new capabilities and discarding constraints once seen as fundamentally stabilizing.
For those of us seeking to cultivate nuclear policies geared toward enhancing strategic stability, the current trend reflects a worrying loss of perspective—a forgetting of the hard-earned lessons of the Cold War. To help put today’s trends in their historical context, at team of the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) developed a new visualization tool and information system that maps every type of nuclear weapon fielded by the five nuclear weapons states (P5) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—from their inception to present day.
Launched last week, the Nuclear Weapons Systems Project seeks a “qualitative rethink” by providing a curated data source for all major nuclear delivery systems ever deployed. By seeing more easily what has changed and when, users can better identify the benefits of states’ long trajectory of narrowing the types of nuclear capabilities in the world, understand the risks of a new expansion of nuclear capabilities, and develop ways to de-risk the current situation and prevent future security crises.
Quality vs. quantity. A key foundation for our project is the understanding that the types of nuclear weapons capabilities deployed at any given time matter greatly because they shape the risks of intentional, unauthorized, or accidental use of a nuclear weapon.
These risks were illustrated perhaps most dramatically by the Euromissiles Crisis in the 1980s, when the introduction of new and improved Soviet intermediate-range missiles on its frontier prompted a deployment of similar missiles by the United States in Europe. Just by their mutual presences, the missiles frayed tensions badly and reduced reaction times to mere minutes, marking a new height in the Cold War. But more than their number, it was the new capabilities—that is, the specific qualities—of the Soviet SS-20 and the American Pershing II missiles that shook the strategic stability of Europe and greatly lowered the threshold of an accidental nuclear conflict.
Excerpt from CSR’s Nuclear Weapon Systems Project showing all systems by years active, country, and mission. For full tracker, data, and interactives, visit the project page. (Credit: Council on Strategic Risks)
Because numerical limits—counting total warheads or bombers, for example—make it easier to measure progress, they have featured heavily in past arms control agreements, security studies, and policy documents alike. Such quantitative approach of reduction in the overall number of deployed nuclear weapons or launchers has therefore been the backbone of many concepts for future arms control steps. But numerous qualitative risk reduction steps have also been taken by nuclear-armed states over the years; and these proved to be some of the most impactful. The Euromissiles Crisis, for example, famously resulted in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated that class of missiles which were particularly destabilizing based on their features. (The INF Treaty stood still until Russia violated it and the Trump administration consequently withdrew from it in 2019.)
It was a qualitative approach again when, at the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia agreed to sharply narrow the types of nuclear weapon systems they fielded. This agreement would contribute to strategic stability by reducing the risk of accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons while still maintaining both countries’ second-strike capability. In its day, this stability bought the precious time needed to bring about further reductions, as were formalized in New START (the treaty that limits US- and Russian- deployed long-range nuclear forces), enabling both countries to meet their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Article VI requirements “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures to relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”
Introduction of new nuclear weapon systems by decade for each P5 country. For definitions, visit the project page. (Credit: Council on Strategic Risks’s Nuclear Weapon Systems project)
Examining every nuclear weapon type. Tallying up every nuclear weapon system ever deployed by the P5 proved to be both a major analytical undertaking and one that immediately illuminated different dimensions of nuclear policy that had been underexplored and may lead to possible future arms control strategies.
Our search across the American, British, Chinese, French, and Soviet/Russian historical arsenals led to more than 250 distinct types of nuclear weapons systems—from early gravity bombs like the American “Fat Man” to modern dual-capable missiles like Russia’s “Kinzhal,” which has been seen in Ukraine. Once identified, the different nuclear systems were then characterized across dimensions of mission (what kind of target(s) the weapon was intended for), type (e.g., categorizing as bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery shells, demolitions, etc.), and fate (when and why a particular system was retired).
One most surprising fact, which is clearly revealed by our tool, is the proportion of nuclear weapon systems that were given a tactical mission—that is, those pieces of ordnance meant for battlefield use. Just under half of all weapons ever introduced were built for tactical use, introducing unique risks over their operational lifetimes. The broader pivot away from tactical nuclear weapons over the past several decades highly successful in terms of bolstering risk reduction and stability; and it’s clear in our timeline that this approach was a hard-won lesson stemming from some of the Cold War’s most dangerous crises.
Number of nuclear weapon systems by mission and by years active for the P5 countries. (Credit: Council on Strategic Risks’s Nuclear Weapon Systems project)
Another finding which jumps out visually is just how fervent the early years of the Cold War were in terms of nuclear weapons development. A full 53 percent of all nuclear systems ever deployed were introduced before the end of 1969—that is, during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.
Specific flashpoints, too, were illustrative. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, 89 different types of nuclear weapons were available to Washington, Moscow, and London, combined. By 1983 and the Able-Archer war scare, France and China had become nuclear weapons states on their own and the number of nuclear weapon systems available worldwide had climbed to 103. Today, as the war in Ukraine grinds on and potential crises dot the globe, 51 active—deployed and considered ready for use—types of nuclear weapons across the arsenals of the P5 countries, with most of those systems in Russia’s nuclear arsenal only.
New insights. The sum of this data shows a familiar, albeit distinctly important, pattern: As nuclear weapon technologies surged forward, the world entered uniquely dangerous periods in which crises erupted despite a plethora of different nuclear capabilities. Crisis after crisis, steps to control an unchecked arms race were found to be both stabilizing and mutually beneficial—only to be discarded or violated, tempting disaster.
The current moment necessitates qualitative approaches more than ever. Only those can provide a necessary historical understanding of the deployment of nuclear weapon types and inform the future of arms control, restraint, and risk reduction. Russia and China are engaging in significant qualitative changes to their nuclear arsenals and doctrines, and some in the United States are advocating taking a similar path. Our tool can help make sense of the historical consequences of such changes for strategic stability. Perhaps even more important, through this tool, the world can now see clearly the risk of backsliding toward dangerous nuclear capabilities that were previously eliminated, as well as the ways in which states may be willing to agree on preventing the expansion in new types of nuclear capabilities.
Through this project, the CSR team hopes to provide a useful source of information and perspective that can be drawn forward and applied now to help avoid destabilizing actions and limit risk in the future. We invite the open use of the dataset by anyone interested in better understanding the arsenals of the P5 over history. For more on the methodology of our research, its limitations and qualifications, and a list of definitions, please see our launch post.
2023 Doomsday Clock Announcement January 24, 2023
This year, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moves the hands of the Doomsday Clock forward, largely (though not exclusively) because of the mounting dangers of the war in Ukraine. The Clock now stands at 90 seconds to midnight—the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been.
Experts agree that future warfare will be characterized by the use of technologies enhanced with artificial intelligence (AI), especially fully-autonomous weapons systems. These capabilities—such as the US Air Force’s “Loyal Wingman” unmanned aerial vehicle or drone—are able to identify, track, and prosecute targets without human oversight. The recent use of these lethal autonomous weapons systems in conflicts—including in Gaza, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine—poses important legal, ethical, and moral questions.
Despite their use, it is still unclear how AI-enhanced military technologies may shift the nature and dynamics of warfare. Those most concerned by the use of AI for military purposes foresee a dystopian future or “AI apocalypse,” in which machines will mature enough to dominate the world. One policy analyst even predicts that lethal autonomous weapons systems “will lead to a seismic change in the world order far greater than that which occurred with the introduction of nuclear weapons.” Other observers question the extent to which AI systems could realistically take over humans, given the complexity of modelling biological intelligence through algorithms. Assuming such extension of AI is possible, militaries that rely on it are incumbered by data and judgment costs that arguably “make the human element in war even more important, not less.”
While useful in discussing the potential effects of AI on global politics, these perspectives do not explain how AI may actually alter the conduct of war, and what soldiers think about this issue. To tackle this problem, I recently investigated how AI-enhanced military technologies—integrated at various decision-making levels and types of oversight—shape the trust of US military officers for these systems, which informs their understanding of the trajectory of war. In the field of AI, trust is defined as the belief that an autonomous technology will reliably perform as expected in pursuit of shared goals.
The XQ-58A Valkyrie “loyal wingman” pilotless combat aerial vehicle, seen here deploying an Altius-600 small unmanned aircraft system, is powered by artificial intelligence and can identify, track, and prosecute targets without human oversight. (Photo: US Air Force. Design: François Diaz-Maurin/Erik English)
To measure the level of trust of the military in lethal autonomous weapons systems, I studied the attitudes of officers attending the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. These officers, from whose ranks the military will draw its future generals and admirals, are responsible for managing the integration and use of emerging capabilities during future conflict. Their attitudes are therefore important to understanding the extent to which AI may shape a new age of war fought by “warbot” armies.
My research shows three key findings. First, officers trust AI-enhanced military technologies differently depending on the decision-making level at which they are integrated and type of oversight of new capabilities. Second, officers can approve or support the adoption of AI-enhanced military technologies, but not trust them, demonstrating a misalignment of attitudes that has implications for military modernization. Third, officers’ attitudes toward AI-enabled capabilities can also be shaped by other factors, including their moral beliefs, concerns for an AI arms race, and level of education. Together, these findings provide the first experimental evidence of military attitudes toward AI in war, which have implications for military modernization, policy oversight of autonomous weapons, and professional military education, including for nuclear command and control.
Four types of AI-enabled warfare
The adoption of AI-enhanced military technologies by different countries can vary in terms of the level of decision-making (tactical or strategic) and the type of oversight (human or machine). Countries can optimize algorithms to perform tactical operations on the battlefield or conduct strategic deliberations in support of overall war aims. Tactically, such technologies can enhance the lethality of field commanders by rapidly analyzing large quantities of data drawn from sensors distributed across the battlefield to generate targeting options faster than adversaries. As cybersecurity expert Jon Lindsay puts it, “combat might be modeled as a game that is won by destroying more enemies while preserving more friendlies.” This is achieved by significantly shortening the “sensor-to-shooter” timeline, which corresponds to the interval of time between acquiring and prosecuting a target. The US Defense Department’s Task Force Lima and Project Maven are both examples of such AI applications.
Strategically, AI-enhanced military technologies can also help political and military leaders synchronize key objectives (ends) with a combination of warfighting approaches (ways) and finite resources (means), including materiel and personnel. New capabilities could even emerge and replace humans in future military operations, including for crafting strategic direction and national-level strategies. As one expert argues, AI has already demonstrated the potential “to engage in complex analyses and strategizing comparable to that required to wage war.”
At the same time, countries can also calibrate the type of oversight or control delegated to AI-enhanced military technologies. These technologies can be designed to allow for greater human oversight, affording enhanced agency over decision-making. Such systems are often called semi-autonomous, meaning they remain under human control. This pattern of oversight characterizes how most AI-enhanced weapons systems, such as the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper drone, currently operate. While the Reaper can fly on autopilot, accounting for changes in the topography and weather conditions to adjust its altitude and speed, humans still make the targeting decisions.
Countries can also design AI-enhanced military technologies with less human oversight. These systems are often referred to as “killer robots” because the human is off the loop. In these applications, humans exercise limited, if any, oversight, even for targeting decisions. Variation in the decision-making level and type of oversight suggests four types of warfare that could emerge globally given the adoption of AI-enhanced military technologies.
The four types of AI-enabled warfare. (Illustration: François Diaz-Maurin)
First, countries could use AI-enhanced military technologies for tactical decision-making with human oversight. This defines what Paul Scharre calls “centaur warfighting,” named after a creature from Greek mythology with the upper body of a human and the lower body and legs of a horse. Centaur warfare emphasizes human control of machines for battlefield purposes, such as the destruction of a target like an enemy’s arms cache.
Second, countries could use AI-enhanced military technologies for tactical decision-making with machine oversight. This flips centaur warfare on its head, literally, evoking another mythical creature from ancient Greece—the minotaur, with the head and tail of a bull and the body of a man. “Minotaur warfare” is characterized by machine control of humans during combat and across domains, which can range from patrols of soldiers on the ground to constellations of warships on the ocean to formations of fighter jets in the air.
Third, strategic decision-making, coupled with machine oversight, frames an “AI-general” or “singleton” type of warfare. This approach invests AI-enhanced military technologies with extraordinary latitude to shape the trajectory of countries’ warfighting, but may have serious implications for the offense-defense balance between countries during conflict. In other words, an AI-general type of warfighting could allow countries to gain and maintain advantages over adversaries in time and space that shape the overall outcomes of war.
Finally, “mosaic warfare” retains human oversight of AI-enhanced military technologies but attempts to capitalize on algorithms to optimize strategic decision-making to impose and exploit vulnerabilities against a peer-adversary. The intent of this warfighting model—which US Marine Corps Gen. (Retired) John Allen calls “hyperwar” and scholars often refer to as algorithmic decision-support systems—is to retain overall human supervision while using algorithms to perform critical enabling tasks. These include predicting possible enemy courses-of-action through a process of “real-time threat forecasting” (which is the mission of the Defense Department’s new Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository System or MARS), identify the most feasible, acceptable, and suitable strategy (which companies such as Palantir and Scale AI are studying how to do), and tailor key warfighting functions, such as logistics, to help militaries gain and maintain the initiative in contested operating environments that are characterized by extended supply lines, such as the Indo-Pacific.
US officers’ attitudes toward AI-enabled warfare
To address how military officers trust AI-enhanced military technologies given variation in their decision-making level and type of oversight, I conducted a survey in October 2023 among officers assigned to the war colleges in Carlisle and Newport. The survey involved four experimental groups that varied the use of an AI-enhanced military technology in terms of decision-making (tactical or strategic) and oversight (human or machine), as well as one baseline group that did not manipulate these attributes. After reading their randomly assigned scenarios, I asked respondents to rate their trust and support in the capability on a scale of one (low) to five (high). I then analyzed the data using statistical methods.
Although my sample is not representative of the US military (nor its branches, like the US Army and Navy), it is what political scientists call a convenience sample. This helps draw extremely rare insights into how servicemembers may trust AI-enhanced military technologies and the effect of this trust on the character of war.
This sample is also a hard test for my understanding of possible shifts in the future of war given the emergence of AI, since I oversampled field-grade officers, including majors/lieutenant commanders, lieutenant colonels/commanders, and colonels/captains. They have years of training and are experts in targeting, and many have deployed to combat and made decisions about drones. They are also emerging senior leaders entrusted to appraise the implications of new technologies for future conflict. These characteristics imply that officers in my sample may be primed to distrust AI-enhanced military technologies more so than other segments of the military, especially junior officers who are often referred to as “digital natives.”
The survey reveals several key findings. First, officers can trust AI-enhanced military technologies in different ways, based on variation in the decision-making level and type of oversight of these new capabilities. While officers are generally distrusting of different types of AI-enhanced weapons, they are least trusting of capabilities used for singleton warfare (strategic decision-making with machine oversight). On the other hand, they demonstrate more trust for mosaic warfare (human oversight of AI-optimized strategic decision-making). This shows that officers consistently prefer human control of AI to either identify nuanced patterns in enemy activity, generate military options to present an adversary with multiple dilemmas, or help sustain warfighting readiness during protracted conflict.
Compared to the baseline group, officers’ trust for AI-enabled military technologies declines more in terms of singleton warfare (18.8 percent) than it does for mosaic warfare (10.5 percent)—see Figure 1. While differences in officers’ mean levels of trust compared to the baseline group are statistically significant for both types of AI-enhanced warfare, they are more pronounced for new military capabilities used for singleton warfare than for mosaic warfare. Also, the average change in probability for officers’ trust in both types of AI-enhanced warfare (that is, the average marginal effect of AI-enhanced military technologies on officers’ trust) is only statistically significant for singleton warfare. Overall, these results suggest that officers have less distrust of AI-enhanced military technologies that are used with human oversight to aid decision-making at higher echelons.
These results for levels of trust are largely mirrored by officers’ attitudes of support. Officers demonstrate less support for AI-enhanced military technologies used for singleton warfare compared to the baseline group, and at virtually the same level—18.3 percent—and degree of statistical significance. Compared to the baseline group, however, officers also support minotaur warfare more than other patterns of AI-enhanced warfare, with change in the level of support around 6.5 percent. This suggests that while officers may have less distrust of AI-enhanced military technologies incorporated at higher levels of decision-making and with human control, they are more supportive of AI-enhanced military technologies used for tactical-level decision-making and with machine supervision. In sum, officers’ attitudes seem to reflect King’s College professor Kenneth Payne’s argument that “warbots will make incredible combatants, but limited strategists.”
Trust and support relative to the baseline group for the four types of AI-enabled warfare. Note: Values represent changes in levels of support and trust for AI-enhanced military technologies by treatment groups compared to the baseline group. When the levels of support and trust drop compared to the baseline group, the values are negative. (Data: Paul Lushenko. Visualization: François Diaz-Maurin)
The officers’ relatively higher support for tactical-level use of AI-enhanced military technologies reveals a second key finding. The officers’ attitudes toward AI-enhanced military technologies can be more pronounced for support than trust. This implies what some scholars call a “trust paradox.” Officers appear to support the adoption of novel battlefield technologies enhanced with AI—even if they do not necessarily trust them. This phenomenon relates mostly to minotaur warfare (the use of AI for tactical-level decision-making and with machine supervision). This suggests that officers expect that AI-enhanced military technologies will collapse an adversary’s time and space for maneuver while expanding the US military’s, which is based on a shortened “sensor-to-shooter” timeline that senior military leaders believe is the lynchpin to defeating near-peer adversaries in future conflict.
Variation in the magnitude of officers’ support for AI-enhanced military technologies used for decision-making at the tactical-level and with machine oversight is greater than shifts in their trust . In addition, the results show that the difference in officers’ attitudes of trust and support are statistically significant: Officers support AI-enhanced military technologies used for minotaur warfare more than they trust them. The average change in the probability that officers will support AI-enhanced military technologies used for minotaur warfare is also higher than for the other three types of AI-enhanced warfare.
Combined, these results indicate a misalignment of beliefs in US officers’ support and trust toward AI-enhanced military technologies. Despite supporting the adoption of such technologies to optimize decision-making at various levels and degrees of oversight, officers do not trust the resulting types of potential warfare on account of emerging AI-enabled capabilities. This result suggests that US officers may feel obliged to embrace projected forms of warfare that go against their own preferences and attitudes, especially the minotaur warfare that is the basis of emerging US Army and Navy warfighting concepts. Trust and support for the four types of AI-enabled warfare. Note: Values represent mean levels of support and trust for AI-enhanced military technologies by treatment groups. (Data: Paul Lushenko. Visualization: François Diaz-Maurin)
Other factors further explain variation in officers’ trust toward AI-enhanced military technologies. In my survey, when controlling for variation in the level of decision-making and type of oversight, I find that officers’ attitudes vis-à-vis these technologies can also be shaped by underlying moral, instrumental, and educational considerations.
Officers who believe that the United States has a moral obligation to use AI-enhanced military technologies abroad reflect a higher degree of trust in these new battlefield capabilities, which is consistent with attitudes of support as well. This suggests that officers’ moral beliefs for the potential benefits of AI-enhanced military technologies used abroad, such as during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, may help overcome their inherent distrust in adopting these capabilities.
In addition, officers who attach an instrumental value to AI-enhanced military technologies and experience a “fear of missing out” attitude toward them—that is, they believe other countries’ adoption of such technologies compels the United States to adopt them too, lest it is disadvantaged in a potential AI arms race—also tend to have greater trust in these emerging capabilities. Similar attitudes of trust are observed when considering education. The results show that higher education reduces officers’ trust in AI-enhanced military technologies, implying that greater or more specialized knowledge raises questions about the merits and limits of AI during future war. Finally, at the intersection of these normative and instrumental considerations, I find that officers who believe that military force is necessary to maintain global order also support the use of AI-enhanced military technologies more. Together, these results reinforce earlier research showing that officers’ worldviews shape their attitudes toward battlefield technologies and that officers can integrate different logics when assessing their trust and support for the use of force abroad.
How to better prepare officers for AI-enabled warfare
This first evidence about US military officers’ attitudes toward AI paints a more complicated picture of the evolving character of war on account of emerging technologies than some analysts allow. Yet, these attitudes have implications for warfighting modernization and policy and for officers’ professional military education, including for the governance of nuclear weapons.
First, although some US military leaders claim that “we are witnessing a seismic change in the character of war, largely driven again by technology,” the emergence of AI-enhanced military technologies in conflict may constitute more an evolution than a revolution. While the wars in Gaza and Ukraine suggest important changes in the way militaries fight, they also reflect key continuities. Militaries have traditionally sought to capitalize on new technologies to enhance their intelligence, protect their forces, and extend the range of their tactical and operational fire, which combine to produce a “radical asymmetry” on the battlefield. Most recently, shifts in how drones are used and constrained by countries have been shown to also shape public perceptions of the legitimate—or illegitimate—use of force, a result consistent with emerging fully autonomous military technologies.
However, the implications of these and other capabilities for strategic outcomes in war is at best dubious. Strategic success during war is still a function of countries’ will to sacrifice soldiers’ lives and taxpayer dollars to achieve political and military objectives that support vital national interests. Indeed, officers in my study may have supported AI-enhanced military technologies used for minotaur warfare the most. But study participants still demonstrated far less trust and support for new battlefield technologies overall than may be expected given the hype—if not hyperbole and fear—surrounding their military innovation. These results suggest that military leaders should temper their expectations regarding the paradigmatic implications of AI for future conflict. In other words, we should “prepare to be disappointed by AI.” The lack of such a cleareyed perspective allows, according to US Army Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ferguson, the emergence of “fashionable theories that transform war into a kabuki of euphemisms” and obscure the harsh realities of combat. It is a clash of will, intensely human, and conditioned by political objectives.
Second, officers’ attitudes of trust for AI-enhanced military technologies are more complex than my study shows. Indeed, as one former US Air Force colonel and currently analyst with the Joint Staff J-8 directorate notes, it is “difficult for operators to predict with a high degree of probability how a system might actually perform against an adaptive adversary, potentially eroding trust in the system.” In another ongoing study, I find that officers’ trust in AI-enhanced military technologies can be shaped by a complex set of considerations. These include technical specifications, namely their non-lethal purpose, heightened precision, and human oversight; perceived effectiveness in terms of civilian protection, force protection, and mission accomplishment; and oversight, including both domestic but especially international regulation. Indeed, one officer in this study noted that trust in AI-enhanced military technologies was based on “compliance to international laws rather than US domestic law.”
These results suggest the need for more testing and experimentation of novel capabilities to align their use to servicemembers’ expectations. Policymakers and military leaders must also clarify the warfighting concepts within which the development of AI-enhanced military technologies should be encouraged; the doctrine guiding their integration in different domains, at different echelons, and for different purposes; and the policies governing their use. For this latter task, officials must explain how US policy coincides with—or diverges from—international laws, as well as what norms condition the use of AI-enhanced military technologies, considering how officers in the field-grade ranks, at least, expect these capabilities to be used. To fill this gap, the White House recently announced a US policy on the responsible military use of AI and autonomous functions and systems, the Defense Department adopted a directive governing the development and use of autonomous weapons in the US military, and the Pentagon also created the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office to help enforce this directive, though this office is reportedly plagued by budgetary and personnel challenges.
Finally, military leaders should also revamp professional military education to instruct officers on the merits and limits of AI. They should explore the application of AI in other strategic contexts, including nuclear command and control. Many initiatives across the US military already reflect this need, especially given officers’ hesitancy to partner with AI-enabled capabilities.
Operationally, “Project Ridgeway,” led by the US Army’s 18th Airborne Corps, is designed to integrate AI into the targeting process. This is matched by “Amelia” and “Loyal Wingman,” which are Navy and Air Force programs designed to optimize staff processes and warfighting. Institutionally, in addition to preexisting certification courses, some analysts encourage the integration of data literacy evaluations into talent-based assessment programs, such as the US Army’s Commander Assessment Program. Educationally, the service academies and war colleges have faculty, research centers, and electives dedicated to studying the implications of AI for future war. The US Army War College recently hired a professor of data science, the US Naval Academy maintains a “Weapons, Robotics, and Control Engineering” research cluster, and the US Naval War College offers an “AI for Strategic Leaders” elective.
The MQ-9 Reaper, seen here firing an Air-to-Ground Missile-114 Hellfire missile, is a remotely controlled pilotless aircraft that can be used for intelligence, reconnaissance, and strikes. (Photo: US Air Force. Design: François Diaz-Maurin)
At the same time, wargames conducted at the US Naval War College and elsewhere suggest that cyber capabilities can encourage automation and pre-delegation of nuclear command and control to tactical-levels of command and incentivize aggressive counterforce strategies. But my results suggest a puzzling outcome that deserves far more testing. Taken at face value, and notwithstanding that the results could be the same as the use of nuclear weapons in war, the results raise a troubling question: Would officers actually be amenable to support a potential automation and pre-delegation of nuclear command and control to the tactical-level AI, even if they do not trust it or trust or support the use of AI to govern counterforce strategies, as my results suggest?
While this conclusion may seem outlandish—contradicting a body of research on the nuclear “taboo,” crisis escalation, and sole presidential authority for the use of these weapons—Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine have encouraged the US military to revisit the possibility of the limited use of nuclear weapons during great power war. Despite or because of the frightening potential of this “back to the future” scenario, which echoes the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War, US war colleges have reinvigorated education for operational readiness during a tactical nuclear exchange between countries engaged in large-scale conflict.
The extent to which these and other initiatives are effectively educating officers on AI is unclear, however. Part of the problem is that the initiatives pit competing pedagogical approaches against each other. Some programs survey data literacy and AI in a “mile wide, inch deep” approach that integrates a single lesson into one course of a broader curriculum. Other programs provide greater development opportunities and a “narrower and deeper” approach, in which a handful of officers voluntarily select electives that ride on top of a broader curriculum. Other programs, like the one at the US Army War College, attempt the “golden thread” approach, which embeds data literacy and AI across courses that frame a broader instructional plan. However, this latter approach forces administrators to make important tradeoffs in terms of content and time and assumes in-depth faculty expertise.
Going forward, the Joint Staff J-7—the directorate responsible for coordinating training and education across the US joint force—should conceptualize professional military education as a continuum of sustained and additive enrichment over time in terms of data literacy and AI instruction. Pre-commissioned students attending the service academies or participating in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps should be exposed to foundational concepts about AI. Junior and mid-grade officers should integrate these insights during training, deployments, and while attending Intermediate Level Education, such as the US Army’s Command and General Staff College. Upon selection to the war colleges, officers should wrestle with conceptual, normative, and instrumental considerations governing the use of AI in combat, which my study suggests can shape military attitudes toward novel technologies.
This end-to-end educational approach, of course, will take time and money to adopt. It is also liable to the prerogatives of different stakeholders, service cultures, and inter-service rivalries. By aligning training and education to clear and feasible learning outcomes, however, this holistic instructional model capitalizes on existing opportunities to ensure that the US military is ready and willing to adopt AI-enhanced military technologies during peacetime and future wars in ways that align with international laws and norms governing their legitimate use.
Paul Lushenko is lieutenant colonel in the US army and director of special operations and a faculty instructor in the US Army War College. He is the co-editor of Drones and Global Order: Implications of Remote Warfare for International Society (Routledge, 2022) and co-author of The Legitimacy of Drone Warfare: Evaluating Public Perceptions (Routledge, 2024). He received his PhD in international relations from Cornell University.
The latest iteration of US policy is out publicly. The matter is rather pertinent given rising concern over possible Russian nuclear weapons use in its (now faltering) invasion of Ukraine. Here are two excerpts from an analysis at the Federation of American Scientists by two noted experts:
On 27 October 2022, the Biden administration finally released an unclassified version of its long-delayed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The classified NPR was released to Congress in March 2022, but its publication was substantially delayed––likely due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Compared with previous NPRs, the tone and content come closest to the Obama administration’s NPR from 2010. However, it contains significant adjustments because of the developments in Russia and China. (See also our global overview of nuclear arsenals)
Despite the challenges presented by Russia and China, the NPR correctly resists efforts by defense hawks and nuclear lobbyists to add nuclear weapons to the U.S. arsenal and delay the retirement of older types. Instead, the NPR seeks to respond with adjustments in the existing force posture and increase integration of conventional and nuclear planning [emphasis added, see below].
Although Joe Biden during his presidential election campaign spoke strongly in favor of adopting no-first-use and sole-purpose policies, the NPR explicitly rejects both for now [emphasis added].
From an arms control and risk reduction perspective, the NPR is a disappointment. Previous efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and the role that nuclear weapons play have been subdued by renewed strategic competition abroad and opposition from defense hawks at home.
Even so, the NPR concludes it may still be possible to reduce the role that nuclear weapons play in scenarios where nuclear use may not be credible[emphasis added].
Unlike previous NPRs, the 2022 version is embedded into the National Defense Strategy document alongside the Missile Defense Review.
Below is our summary and analysis of the major portions of the NPR…
Nuclear-Conventional Integration
Although the integration of nuclear and conventional capabilities into strategic deterrence planning has been underway for years, the NPR seeks to deepen it further. It “underscores the linkage between the conventional and nuclear elements of collective deterrence and defense” and adopts “an integrated deterrence approach that works to leverage nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to tailor deterrence under specific circumstances [emphasis added].”
This is not only intended to make deterrence more flexible and less nuclear focused when possible, but it also continues the strategy outlined in the 2010 NPR and 2013 Nuclear Employment Guidance to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by relying more on new conventional capabilities.
According to the NPR, “Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are employed.” Although further integration will take time, the NPR describes “how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent.” An important part of this integration is to “better synchronize nuclear and non-nuclear planning, exercises, and operations[emphasis added].”
Beyond force structure issues, this effort also appears to be a way to “raise the nuclear threshold” by reducing reliance on nuclear weapons but still endure in regional scenarios where an adversary escalates to limited nuclear use [emphasis added]. In contrast, the 2018 NPR sought low-yield non-strategic “nuclear supplements” for such a scenario, and specifically named a Russian so-called “escalate-to-deescalate” scenario as a potentially possibility for nuclear use.
Moreover, conventional integration can also serve to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear strategic attacks, and could therefore pave the way for a sole-purpose policy in the future (see also An Integrated Approach to Deterrence Posture by Adam Mount and Pranay Vaddi).
Finally, increasing conventional capabilities in deterrence planning also allows for deeper and better integration of Allies and partners without having to rely on more controversial nuclear arrangements.
A significant challenge of deeper nuclear-conventional integration in strategic deterrence is to ensure that it doesn’t blur the line between nuclear and conventional war and inadvertently increase nuclear signaling during conventional operations[emphasis added]…
An earlier post on the “escalate-to-deescalate” scenario:
There’s a lot more involved than the funding announcements, new radar systems and infrastructure that the government has highlighted. In particular the government has said little publicly about various major changes to NORAD’s strategic focuses and operational priorities that the US has been considering. Further to this post,
here are my extracts from a substantial “commentary” at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute think thank by a professor at the University of Manitoba (see end of the quote), one of the few Canadian academics really on top of this subject and its technical ramifications–along with his colleague Andrea Charron:
This commentary by James Fergusson looks at the future of NORAD modernization and the threat posed by new military technologies.
First formally identified as a priority in the 2017 defence white paper, Strong, Secure and Engaged, and three years after NORAD modernization was identified in Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s mandate letter to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, the Trudeau government has finally earmarked funds for North American defence modernization. In the 2021 federal budget, the government did commit by defence standards, a paltry $252 million to “lay the groundwork for North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) modernization and sustain existing continental and Arctic defence capabilities” (Canada 2021). Yet no spending details were provided.
Subsequently, in January 2022, the government awarded a $592 million contract for in-service support of the North Warning System (NWS).[1] In the recent 2022 budget, $6.1 billion over five years was added to the defence budget (Canada 2022b), although the amount committed to NORAD modernization was left unspecified. In June, Defence Minister Anand announced $4.9 billion over six years, and $40 billion over 20 years for modernization with some additional details.[2] A month later on July 21, the Department of National Defence (DND) provided further details on its fact sheet [see here], though this still lacked specificity[emphasis added].
The announcement and subsequent July DND fact sheet raise two areas for evaluation. The first concerns the funding commitments relative to the reality of defence spending in Canada and infrastructure construction in the Canadian Arctic. The second relates to the underlying policy implications, which have not been acknowledged or presented[emphasis added]…
…North America, NORAD and the Arctic NWS in particular are a politically sensitive domestic issue because of longstanding Canadian sovereignty concerns relative to the United States. As such, North American defence cooperation is always liable to the general state of relations between Canada and the United States, which is one of the reasons why Ottawa has preferred NORAD to operate beneath the political radar in Canada[emphasis added].
In this regard, highly negative Canadian attitudes towards the Trump presidency arguably made forward movement politically risky and, as such, one might interpret the 2017 commitment sans detail and money as a political “trial balloon.” Regardless, the election of US President Biden in 2020 changed the political climate overnight. In addition, the Russian invasion of Ukraine eliminated any potential domestic political opposition to NORAD modernization, which one might have expected with charges of “militarizing” the Arctic and “kowtowing” to the Americans…
Of course, building new radar lines or any other NORAD-related Arctic infrastructure is no easy task, with a short construction season, limited maritime transportation capacity and the large distances involved.[9] Alongside this reality, six years is a very short time in the historically lengthy Canadian procurement process with an average closer to 15 years. Assuming that the internal specification of requirements process has been completed for the unspecified first six-year stage, requests for proposals or bids have to be issued, companies need to construct their bids taking into account buy Canadian provisions in terms of industrial and technological benefits, as well as the government’s commitment to significant Indigenous participation. Next, the bids must be evaluated, contracts issued and finally the acquisition and deployment undertaken.[10]Where this all stands today is unknown publicly[emphasis added].
In other words, the likelihood that DND can spend $4.9 billion over six years appears very low[emphasis added]…
…No one can realistically predict the state of the economy over the next year or so, never mind 20 years. And National Defence will not be immune from government fiscal retrenchment or demands to re-direct funds during an economic downturn to other more politically salient economic and social pressures.
Alongside these factors, if history is our guide, the actual final costs of NORAD modernization are likely to exceed significantly $40 billion, especially given the unpredictable costs of acquiring new advanced technologies for the NORAD mission suite as they emerge over the next 20 years[emphasis added]…
…As deterrence by denial is the central underlying strategic rationale for NORAD modernization, demonstrated capabilities and their communication to existing and potential adversaries are important. Furthermore, with modern space-based capabilities, nothing can be truly hidden. In other words, not least of all relative to the transparency and accountability mantra of the government and the magnitude of investment, the government and DND need to be more forthcoming on NORAD modernization. This, in turn, is linked to the unspoken parameters or limits of NORAD modernization in government thinking about Canada’s role in the defence of North America[emphasis added].
As best that can be discerned from DND’s announcements, NORAD modernization is primarily limited to the Arctic approaches and dominated by the NWS replacement, now labelled the Northern Approaches Surveillance System (NASS), supporting infrastructure (forward operating locations) and associated command, control and communication infrastructure. At Trenton, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), in reply to a media question, stated, “for Canada, we are focused upon 10 to 2 o’clock that is why it is so important we are integrated with the US as they cover the other avenues of approaches” (CPAC 2022). Apparently, at least for now, the east and west coasts of Canada (9 to 10, and 2 to 3 o’clock) are solely an American responsibility. What this, in turn, entails in terms of surveillance infrastructure relative to Canadian territory is unspecified[emphasis added].
…Indicative today is the previous NORAD Commander’s emphasis on obtaining Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Although the current Commander, US General Glen VanHerck, has dropped it from the current NORAD lexicon, it remains in play in the United States military generally and is implicitly embedded in his objective to ensure that NORAD has all-domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority for deterrence, defence and warfighting[emphasis added] (NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs 2021).
…Although unclear, the new NASS will likely be located across the Canadian High Arctic. Consideration also needs to be given to developing a radar network at the lower latitudes. If cruise and hypersonic missiles pass over the Arctic line, there exists no significant capability to track them[emphasis added], as internal civilian radars integrated into NORAD after 9/11 lack the capacity. Of course, these radars could be located in the northern continental United States, but no information has been provided.
This, in turn, raises the government’s funding commitment to the active defence or interception side of the deterrence equation. For now, the government is committed only to acquire new short-, medium- and long-range air-to-air missiles for the new F-35 interceptor fleet (a requirement for NORAD and overseas missions). It has also committed to a new air-to-air refuelling fleet to extend the range of the F-35, allowing it to intercept bombers and other aircraft (archers in NORAD parlance) capable of standoff air-launched missiles. Even so, the probability of intercepting the archers is difficult to estimate and depends upon the ratio of bombers (as well as submarines) and missiles to interceptors. The likelihood that all the archers and the missiles (arrows) will be defeated is below 100 percent. No defence is perfect. Besides, striking at the archers close to, if not in, Russian territory implies NORAD acquiring a pre-emptive strike capability, which will likely prove problematic for the Canadian government, which perceives NORAD as a defensive, reactive institution, not an offensive one[emphasis added].
Regardless, NORAD is in the missile defence world, and this raises the issue of whether Canada needs to invest in ground-based point defences (surface-to-air missiles) to protect high-valued targets[emphasis added]. Such targets are twofold: Canadian cities and industrial centres, and military bases. In terms of the latter, this includes the NASS itself and Arctic forward operating locations. Such defences, however, raise the thorny issue of ballistic missile defence, which the defence minister at Trenton stated there was no policy change, but the government would continue to track the issue.
Someday, perhaps, the government will explain its allergy to ballistic missile defence[emphasis added]…
All of these policy implications, conveniently ignored in the NORAD modernization announcements, suggest a major transformation of NORAD is on the horizon[emphasis added, see posts noted below]. In some ways, they are reminiscent of the policy implications of initial Canadian-American air defence cooperation in the 1950s, which led to the creation of NORAD itself as a function of military requirements. In other words, NORAD modernization is much more than new infrastructure. It is about a much broader and deeper NORAD and thus an expanded and new continental defence relationship[emphasis added–heard anything about that from this government?].
If the past is a guide, this will take place with little, if any, Canadian public debate about a “new” NORAD, as the government seeks to avoid the sensitive and feared issue of Canadian sovereignty relative to the United States. Perhaps it would be better if the government and DND go beyond simple funding announcements, as important as they are, to the lay the groundwork for a well-informed public debate…
Certainly, NORAD and DND officials are well aware of the implications of NORAD modernization beyond new infrastructure, as may be the government in previously announcing a defence review[emphasis added]. Unfortunately, like the relative paucity of information and timelines in the funding announcements, both have been silent about the nature and scope of the review. Regardless, time is pressing, and for the foreseeable future North America and Canada will remain vulnerable to the threat posed by the new military technologies, which can affect how both Canada and the United States respond to future international crises overseas…
In effect, the funding commitments are an important first step. Beyond that, the government needs to be more forthcoming to ensure a mature, well-informed debate on North American defence and NORAD[emphasis added]. No longer can government and DND simply ignore North America for long stretches to time. The world has changed, and with it the significance of North American defence. Funding is just the tip of the iceberg.
About the author
James Fergusson is the Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba and Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba. He is the co-author with Andrea Charron of NORAD: In Perpetuity and Beyond. He received his BA (Hons) and MA degrees from the University of Manitoba and his Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia in 1989. He teaches a range of courses in the areas of international relations, foreign and defence policy, and strategic studies. He has published numerous articles on strategic studies, non-proliferation and arms control, the defence industry, and Canadian foreign and defence policy
Other posts on evolving US thinking about NORAD (most recent first):
As Prof. Fergusson says we still have little idea about what our government thinks. Perhaps it is simply avoiding thinking about difficult matters that might well present, er, challenges in terms of public reaction if discussed with any seriousness. Just stick with emphasizing the money spent in Canada, especially with indigenous communities and on high-tech, and jobs.
now from pp. 43-44 of Alex Wellerstein’s Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States (review here):
…
Secrecy came easily for Roosevelt. He was no stranger to diplomatic intrigue and the value of cutting some people, and the public [and subsequently historians], out of the discussion. The fact that he kept a minimal paper trail for many important decisions, and at times told people what he thought they wanted to hear, has made it difficult for historians to fully assess his internal motivations.”
Quite. And to assess many other things properly. Other relevant posts:
Prof. Wellerstein’s website is here: “his online nuclear weapon effects simulator, the NUKEMAP, has been used by over 25 million people globally”. He tweets here.
(Caption for photo at top of the post: “The control room of a Russian nuclear missile base, outside of Moscow [Photo by robert wallis/Corbis via Getty Images]”.)
Extracts below from a comprehensive analysis at Comment is Freed from Sam (tweets here) and Lawrence Freedman, with some comments of mine at the end. It all rather brings to mind these famous lines:
There are known knowns — there are things we know we know…We also know there are known unknowns — that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know.
In other words, it may all be a bit of a crap shoot.
Yet the nuclear issue now comes up frequently. It is currently probably the matter for the greatest speculation, including in Kyiv and Washington, when officials and commentators ask what Putin might do next. Rose Gottemoeller, a former top US nuclear policy-maker and NATO’s deputy secretary general until 2019, told the BBC of her fear that ‘Putin and his coterie’ will ‘strike back now in really unpredictable ways that may even involve weapons of mass destruction.’ She did not expect ICBM launches, but possibly another form of nuclear sabre-rattling – ‘a single strike over the Black Sea, or perhaps a strike at a Ukrainian military facility’ to ‘strike terror not only into the hearts of the Ukrainians’ and its allies.
This is not a possibility that should be dismissed in a cavalier fashion. Russia has abundant stores of nuclear weapons, in a variety of shapes and sizes, and Putin might be desperate enough to use them. Because he has already done some really stupid things who can say for sure that he won’t do anything even stupider. This possibility is not negligible, and that is worrying enough in itself. But it is not enough to answer the question of whether he might give a nuclear order by references to his mental state or assumptions that because he is being humiliated he might respond with a tantrum to end all tantrums. We need to consider exactly what problems, military and/or political this might solve. Matthew Kroenig writing for the Atlantic Council warns that a Russian nuclear strike ‘could cause a humanitarian catastrophe, deal a crippling blow to the Ukrainian military, divide the Western alliance, and compel Kyiv to sue for peace.’ But will it?..
It would…represent an extreme version of the behaviour his forces have already been following. Russia is not short of means of causing hurt and suffering and has shown no reluctance to use them. Ukrainian towns and cities have been pummelled by Russian shells, rockets and missiles, directed against residential buildings, factories, transportation hubs, power plants and much more. Over last weekend the Pivdennoukrainsk nuclear power plant in Mykolaiv oblast was struck. Thankfully the reactor was not hit, although there were explosions only 300 metres away.
…Despite all that they have been through Ukrainians are showing extraordinary levels of resilience, unity, and determination. When asked, the Ukrainian government says that even nuclear use would have the same effect.
…Andrei Gurulev, a Lieutenant General, member of the Duma, and regular media commentator…was directly involved in Russia actions in the Donbas in 2014-15. He is something of a charmer. The Ukrainian authorities have released an intercepted call from him on February 28, 2022, just after the invasion, issuing orders to set Ukrainian households on fire. He instructed an invading unit: ’Burn them, damn it, burn them! Once you’ve thrown them out of there – finish the house, burn it down! Spit at that f*cking humanism!’ He has a thing about destroying Britain. On state television in August, when asked if Britain was readying for war with Russia, Gurulev replied that this was already the case. Russia was fighting both Britain and the US in Ukraine…
Andrei Gurulev, a Lieutenant General, member of the Duma, and regular media commentator, who was directly involved in Russia actions in the Donbas in 2014-15. He is something of a charmer. The Ukrainian authorities have released an intercepted call from him on February 28, 2022, just after the invasion, issuing orders to set Ukrainian households on fire. He instructed an invading unit: ’Burn them, damn it, burn them! Once you’ve thrown them out of there – finish the house, burn it down! Spit at that f*cking humanism!’ He has a thing about destroying Britain. On state television in August, when asked if Britain was readying for war with Russia, Gurulev replied that this was already the case. Russia was fighting both Britain and the US in Ukraine.
More recently Gurulyov noted that Biden had warned Russia against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He observed that ‘we may use them but not in Ukraine.’ This time he made particular mention of strikes against decision-making centres in Berlin, threatening Germany with total chaos, along with his familiar theme of turning the British Isles into a ‘martian desert’ in 3 minutes flat.’ He added, oddly, that this could be done with ‘tactical nuclear weapons, not strategic ones,’ and, confidently, that the US would not respond. All this was linked to preventing NATO getting directly involved. ‘We shouldn’t be shy about it or fear it. … They should tuck their tails in and keep up yapping.’
Strip away the absurd rhetoric and braggadocio, and it is clear the focus remains on deterring NATO countries, now including the provision of Ukraine with the means to mount deep strikes against Russian territory. As another recent example, Russian TV presenter Olga Skabeyeva, who regularly describes the current conflict as World War III, made specific threats with regard to the potential delivery of the long-range (300km) Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile from the US to Ukraine. ‘Russia has every right to defend itself. That’s to say, to strike Poland or the US’s Ramstein base in Germany, for example [with nukes?].’ The current narrative in Moscow is that the troubles they now face are not because of the exertions of the Ukrainians but because they are backed by the best Western weapons. It is a familiar refrain that they are at war with NATO.
…President Biden has been clear that he does not want to give Putin an excuse to escalate, which is one reason why he has been reluctant to authorise the ATACMS deployment[emphasis added]. Another reason is that the Pentagon is unconvinced that this would make a large difference to Ukraine’s military performance.
The Americans have also sought to warn the Russians about the risks associated with nuclear escalation. In an interview with CBS, the President explained that turning to nuclear or other unconventional weapons would ‘change the face of war unlike anything since World War II. … They’ll become more of a pariah in the world than they ever have been.’ He added that ‘depending on the extent of what they do will determine what response would occur.’
Backed Into a Corner
…Russia is not truly backed into a corner. At the moment there is no existential threat to the Russian state, even if one might be developing to Putin’s personal position, and that the way to get out of any corner is to cross the border back home. And if he wants to escalate he has other options. To quote the New York Times again:
‘more indiscriminate bombardment of Ukrainian cities, a campaign to kill senior Ukrainian leaders, or an attack on supply hubs outside Ukraine — located in NATO countries like Poland and Romania — that are channelling extraordinary quantities of arms, ammunition and military equipment into the country.’
…these are all things he has either done to a degree, tried and failed to do, or simply not attempted because they are too difficult. If the option was there it would have made no sense to wait to interdict the weapon supply lines from the western borders into Ukraine, but Russia has not been able to do this. Attacking Poland or Romania would invoke NATO’s Article V. Russian leaders are well aware of this for they refer to it often. This is how nuclear deterrence works in the other direction and keeps the conflict contained.
So if initiating a direct war with NATO is too dangerous, and the value of deterrence lies in limiting the forms of assistance provided to Ukraine, what about using such weapons against Ukrainian targets?
…Should the Ukrainians start moving against Russian position in the Donbas, or capture the large number of Russian troops defending territory in Kherson and cut off from new supplies, then Putin would face calamity. In the face of such calamity would nuclear use be of any value?
Two possible roles are identified: first, to affect the course of the fighting on the ground, and second, more coercive, to threaten to raise the stakes to terrifying heights, including attacks on cites, persuading the Ukrainians to give up. To a degree this second role is inherent in the first. Once the nuclear threshold has been passed then the barriers to further escalation has been reduced. How might this be done?
…It is assumed, but who can know, that the aim would be to combine any coercive value with a direct military value. This is why the focus is on the short-range low-yield ‘battlefield’ weapons, sometimes mistakenly described as ‘tactical’ (any nuclear use has strategic repercussions). This is where the analysis gets tricky.
The Russian armed force have thought long and hard about nuclear strategy. A detailed and subtle analysis by Michael Kofman and Anya Loukianova Fink shows that at least in theory the Russian military do not believe that limited nuclear use necessarily leads to uncontrolled escalation. The potential targets for limited nuclear strikes are those already identified for conventional strikes –critical infrastructure more than cities. How far this would be taken once the first threshold had been passed would depend on the opponent’s reaction. Russian thinking on the matter, however, is geared to great power conflicts, and not an attempt to crush a supposedly weaker and smaller neighbour [emphasis added, just what I thought reading their piece–see also the tweet and post noted at the bottom of this one]. Moreover, this is the sort of escalation that Putin was talking about in his Uzbekistan press conference for which he does not need nuclear weapons to have the desired effect.
That leaves the question of using the weapons to affect the ongoing battles underway on the ground. Here it is worth noting the issues that surround any attempt to use these as if they were normal weapons of war. In this role they can be seen as uniquely powerful versions of conventional munitions – from bombs, depth charges, shells, and mines, with the added ingredient of radiation. In this regard they are best employed against large targets, for example a gathering of troops preparing for an offensive. The alternative would be a strong defensive position. Ideally this target would be some distance away from Russian troops…
Given the nature of the fighting in Ukraine this is not at all straightforward. There are rarely massed formations operating in either defence or attack. Units tend to be dispersed. Consider an account (from a Russian source) about the offensive in Kherson. It notes that the Ukrainians have made their impact by messing with the Russian supply lines while advancing not by armoured thrusts (unlike Kharkiv) but instead by using small groups of infantry ‘creeping’ forward over watery ground, for this is an area cut through by irrigation canals. Finding a useful target for nuclear use in such circumstances would be difficult, and, given how little it might achieve, a strange way to start a nuclear war. Moscow has shown no great care for the populations of Luhansk and Donetsk, but as their liberation is supposedly at the heart of Russian war aims it would also be strange to mark this by nuclear detonations.
Conclusion
There is no evidence for now that weapons are being moved into position or being prepared for such strikes. US intelligence, which has been extraordinarily precise so far can be expected to pick up any details (or at least the Russian would need to assume that). No effort has been made to explain to the Russian public why such strikes might be necessary. After all Putin still insists that this is a limited operation and has refused to put the country on a war footing. As we have seen Russian figures talk garrulously about scenarios for nuclear use against NATO countries but not Ukraine[emphasis added]. We can also assume that neither of Putin’s recent interlocutors – Xi and Modi – would be enthused. This is a scenario largely generated in the West trying to anticipate contingencies that have yet to be reached.
…[Putin] would of course need a compliant chain of command to implement an order to go nuclear, especially as part of a complex military operation on the ground.
…if use did make a difference the fundamental political problem would still be there: how to pacify a hostile population with a depleted army. Meanwhile nuclear threats do serve an important purpose for Putin, in deterring more direct NATO engagement. Should he use nuclear weapons in a limited and possibly futile way, the threshold would still have been crossed and all bets would be off in terms of a NATO response, which might well include doing exactly those things Putin was trying to deter. This would also be true of possible Ukrainian moves against Belgorod and Crimea.
There is one qualification to this analysis, which is Crimea. This territory was seized from Ukraine in 2014 and Ukraine wants it back. Militarily this would be even more challenging than the other acts of ‘de-occupation’ that Ukraine wants to achieve. There are ways of making the Russian hold on Crimea more difficult without a military assault, and Zelensky has spoken of this as a problem that might require a diplomatic solution, although if Russia shows no interest in a negotiated withdrawal his forces will keep on going. Rather than fretting about some future craziness, efforts might more usefully be put into preparing for the moment when Putin realises that he has lost and may seek to hold on to Crimea. At this time all the issues connected with ending this war – sanctions, reparations, war crimes, prisoner exchanges, and security guarantees – would need to be addressed. We may find it difficult to imagine that Putin can lose, and wonder about how well he will cope with his failed aggression, but it is entirely possible that at some point he will run out of options, and have to look failure in the eye.
And a postscript from Prof. Freedman:
I've added a postscript to my post on nuclear dimensions to war from yesterday to take account of Putin's speech. It doesn't change my analysis. The nuclear threat was still deterrent and not linked to referendums in occupied territories. https://t.co/rqrs6wNosZ
The sixty-four million rouble question: would Bad Vlad be willing to accept looking failure in the eye? Knowing it almost certainly would entail his removal from office. With what personal consequences thereafter? How brave a man is he? How secure is his position even now?
President Zelensky has made it clear Ukraine wants Crimea back. Keeping the peninsula may well be the true “red line”, for both Putin and many Russians. Will the West do what it can to help Ukraine recover its territory–but make it clear that Crimea is not included? Unless Russia (with Putin still in charge?) makes it absolutely clear that it has rejected the use of nukes in all events.
One hopes that NATO intelligence services are doing all they can to establish back channels to the Russian military to explore if they can be engaged about these issues, especially the nuclear one.
Still fraught times ahead. One can hope for a sudden, almost total collapse of the Russian position in Ukraine, combined with a rapid ousting of Bad Vlad. But what are the chances?
Right now this is not about the implementation of any actually existing nuclear weapons use doctrine. It’s about what Putin will choose to do, if he can do it.
UPDATE: Consider this in the context of the post above:
The Kremlin is planning staged referendum in 4 Ukrainian regions Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk & Zaporizhzhia to make them part of Russia. Medvedev said that would enable Moscow to use “any means” to defend them. https://t.co/lnuefG1HN9
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) —Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a partial mobilization of reservists in Russia on Wednesday, risking a deeply unpopular step that follows a string of humiliating setbacks for his troops nearly seven months after invading Ukraine.
It’s the first call-up in Russia since World War II and is sure to further fuel tensions with the Western backers of Ukraine, who derided the move as an act of weakness. The move also sent Russians scrambling to buy plane tickets out of the country.
It comes after Russian authorities tried to recruit more fighters into volunteer battalions and amid reports of widespread recruitment in prisons, as the Kremlin has struggled to replenish its troops.
The Russian leader, in a seven-minute televised address to the nation aired Wednesday morning, also warned the West that he isn’t bluffing over using all the means at his disposal to protect Russia’s territory, in what appeared to be a veiled reference to Russia’s nuclear capability[emphasis added]. Putin has previously warned the West not to back Russia against the wall and has rebuked NATO countries for supplying weapons to help Ukraine.
The total number of reservists to be called up could be as high as 300,000[emphasis added, that could be larger than the original invading force], officials said…
That tweet mentioned above, with a following thread worth the look:
(Caption for photo at top of the post: “This handout photograph taken Sept. 9, 2022, released Sept. 11, shows Ukrainian soldiers loading an abandoned Russian military vehicle on a trailer during the Ukrainian Army counter-offensive in Kharkiv region. (General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces / AFP)”.)
Plus that US pivot to the Indo-Pacific. First, excerpts from today’s NY Times column by Ross Douthat (full text at link):
The autumn and winter will be…supplying answers to the two questions that will determine the war’s duration. First, how much territory can Ukraine liberate from Russian occupation? Second, how grim and desperate will the European winter be with normal Russian energy supplies cut off, and what political consequences will follow?..
In the best-case military scenario, where the Russians end up retreating pell-mell from the current front lines, the danger is that desperation might push Moscow toward nuclear brinkmanship — especially given the Russian strategic posture that envisions using tactical nuclear weapons to reverse battlefield defeats [see this 2020 post: “Public Russian Nuclear Weapons Use Doctrine–Willing to go First if Necessary“].
…This is likely to be the season where that gap closes, where the speculative becomes reality, and we learn more about what war in the longer term will mean.
In which case we should hope both for rapid Ukrainian advances, and for wisdom, care and caution to accompany any victories they may win.
Keep in mind that most European defence spending increases have basically assumed a Russian victory over Ukraine and hence a markedly increased threat to NATO (see this March post: “Ukraine: Quite a few Euros Giving Defence Budgets Big Boosts–and PM Trudeau’s Government? Note UPDATE“). So reversing most, if not all, those planned increases would, one accepts, seem reasonable as a consequence of a decisive defeat Though for how long would the threat remain low? It is difficult to see the Russians passively accepting the end of their great power status.
One has Germany especially in view given the difficult economic prospects there this winter unless somehow Russia rapidly resumes full natural gas exports.
And would Euros still buy all those F-35s they have committed to?
Such a Russian defeat would also give PM Trudeau’s government a rationale to do nothing about raising Canadian defence spending (which they really do not like)–indeed funds for NORAD modernization, the RCAF’s planned 88 F-35s and the full fifteen new (hideously expensive) frigates for the RCN could well be at risk.
On the bright side a diminished Russian threat might allow the US finally to really, really focus on the PRC and Indo-Pacific. And perhaps the UK and France might increase their efforts in that direction.
Also, with new Russian arms supplies, and support for existing equipment now problematic as Moscow attempt to resupply its own forces, might well India feel it necessary to relax somewhat its “strategic autonomy” position and turn more to the US/West in the face of PRC threats?
Ditto for Vietnam, and maybe Indonesia.
Finally, how will the PRC react without Russia to distract the West militarily? The threat to Taiwan? Go soon before US can do a major rebalance?
Uncertain roads ahead. Yet another new world order?
Two tweets:
US policymakers agonizing on how to credibly uphold NATO commitments while shifting focus to East Asia only for the Russian army to self-immolate in a pointless war of choice brings to mind the Bismarckian adage about God favoring fools, drunks, children, and the United States.
— Open Source Stupidity (OSSTU) Starfish (@IRHotTakes) September 10, 2022
These are war aims that the US must whole-heartedly support with more offensive and longer range weapons in greater numbers so as to end the war early, in the interest of Europe’s security order, and to then more liberally concentrate resources on Asia, once Russia is defeated. https://t.co/QXaN24X2fH
now the “Editor’s note”, a table on Indian nuclear forces, and the section on ground-bases ballistic missiles of another report at The Federation of American Scientist by two who know their nukes:
Editor’s note: The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the status of India’s nuclear arsenal, which includes approximately 160 warheads. India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, with at least four new weapons systems now under development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems. Several of these systems are nearing completion and will soon be combat-ready. India is estimated to have produced nough military plutonium for 140 to 210 nuclear warheads but has likely produced only 160. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities. India’s nuclear strategy, traditionally focused on Pakistan, now appears to place increased emphasis on China, and Beijing is now in range of Indian missiles.
This article is freely available in PDF format in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ digital magazine (published by Taylor & Francis) at this link. To cite this article, please use the following citation, adapted to the appropriate citation style: Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda(2022)Indian nuclear weapons, 2022,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,78:4,224-236,DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2087385
To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, click here...
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Land-based ballistic missiles
India has four types of land-based, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles that appear to be operational: the short-range Prithvi-II and Agni-I, the medium-range Agni-II, and the intermediate-range Agni-III. At least three other Agni missiles are in development and nearing deployment: the medium-range Agni-P, the intermediate-range Agni-IV, and the near-intercontinental-range Agni-V.
It remains to be seen how many of these missile types India plans to keep in its arsenal. Some may serve as technology development programs toward longer-range missiles. Although the Indian government has made no statements about the future size or composition of its land-based missile force, short-range and redundant missile types could potentially be discontinued, with only medium-and long-range missiles deployed in the future to provide a mix of strike options against Pakistan and China. Otherwise, the government seemingly appears to be planning to field a diverse missile force that will be expensive to maintain and operate[emphasis added].
The Prithvi-II missile was “the first missile to be developed” under India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Program for “India’s nuclear deterrence,” according to the government (Press Information Bureau 2013). The missile can deliver a nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of 350 kilometers (217 miles). Given the relatively small size of the Prithvi missile (nine meters long and one meter in diameter), the launcher is difficult to spot in satellite images and therefore little is known about its deployment locations. It is thought India has four Prithvi missile groups (222, 333, 444, and 555) with about 30 launchers deployed close to the border with Pakistan [emphasis added]. Possible locations include Jalandhar in Punjab, as well as Banar, Bikaner, and Jodhpur in Rajasthan.
The two-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile Agni-I missile became operational in 2007, three years after its induction into the armed forces. The short-range missile can deliver a nuclear or conventional warhead to a distance of approximately 700 kilometers (435 miles). The mission of Agni-I is thought to be focused on targeting Pakistan; we estimate that up to 20 launchers are deployed in western India[emphasis added], possibly including the 334th Missile Group. In September 2020, India used an Agni-I booster to conduct a test of its developmental scramjet-powered Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (Jha 2020).
The two-stage, solid-fuel, rail-mobile Agni-II – an improvement on the Agni-I – can deliver a nuclear or conventional warhead to a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles). The missile may have been inducted into the armed forces in 2008, but technical issues delayed its operational capability until 2011. Around 10 launchers are thought to be deployed in northern India, possibly including the 335th Missile Group. Targeting is probably focused on western, central, and southern China[emphasis added]. Although the Agni-II appeared to suffer from technical issues and failed several of its previous test launches, more recent successful tests in 2018 and 2019 indicate that previous technical issues could have since been resolved (Liu 2018; The Hindu 2019).
The Agni-III – a two-stage, solid-fuel, rail-mobile, intermediate-range ballistic missile – can deliver a nuclear warhead to a distance of over 3,200 kilometers (1,988 miles). The Indian Ministry of Defence declared in 2014 that the Agni-III is “in the arsenal of the armed forces” (Ministry of Defence 2014) and the Strategic Forces Command conducted its fifth user trial on November 30, 2019, from Abdul Kalam Island on India’s east coast. The Agni-III failed its first night trial – deemed a “very crucial” test – with the missile falling into the sea after the first-stage separation (Rout 2019). No test launches of the Agni-III have been publicly reported since this failed test in 2019.
It is still early in the Agni-III deployment; there are probably fewer than 10 launchers deployed, and the full operational status is uncertain. The longer range potentially allows India to deploy the Agni-III units further back from the Pakistani and Chinese borders[emphasis added]. More than a decade ago, while the missile was still under development, an army spokesperson remarked, “With this missile, India can even strike Shanghai” (India Today 2008) – although this would require launching the Agni-III from the very northeastern corner of India. From that region, the Agni-III would, for the first time, bring Beijing within range of Indian nuclear weapons.
India is also developing the Agni-IV missile – a two-stage, solid-fuel, road- and rail- mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile with the capability to deliver a single nuclear warhead to a distance of over 3,500 kilometers (2,175 miles), with the Ministry of Defence listing the range as 4,000 kilometers (2,485 miles) (Ministry of Defence 2014). Following the final development test in 2014, the ministry declared that Agni-IV “serial production will begin shortly.” Since then, three user launches have been conducted by the Strategic Forces Command, the most recent in December 2018, but the missile is not yet fully operational.
Although the Agni-IV will be capable of striking targets in nearly all of China from northeastern India (including Beijing and Shanghai), India is also developing the longer-range Agni-V[emphasis added] – a three-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile, near-intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering a warhead to a distance of more than 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles). The extra range will allow the Indian military to establish Agni-V bases in central and southern India, further away from the Chinese border[emphasis added]. The Agni-V has been successfully flight tested eight times in total, with the most recent test launch conducted in October 2021. The 2021 test was the first user trial for the Agni-V, and additional tests will likely be required before the missile becomes operational (Government of India 2021b; Philip 2021a).
The Agni-V missile brings an important new capability to the Indian strike force. Unlike current Indian land-based ballistic missiles, the Agni-V is carried in a sealed canister on the launcher. The first two test- launches used a rail launcher, but since 2015, all launches have been conducted from a road-mobile launcher. The launcher, which is known as the Transport-cum-Tilting vehicle-5 (TCT-5), is a 140-ton, 30-meter, 7-axle trailer pulled by a 3-axle Volvo truck (DRDO Newsletter 2014). The canister design “will reduce the reaction time drastically . . . just a few minutes from ‘stop-to-launch,’”[emphasis added] the former head of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation said in 2013 (Times of India 2013). Several Agni-V trans- porter erector launchers (TELs) are clearly visible on commercial satellite imagery of the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) integration center north of Hyderabad, as well as at other sites across the country (see Figure 1).
In June and December 2021, India test-launched its new two-stage, solid-fuel, Agni-P medium-range ballistic missile, which the Indian Government calls a “new generation” nuclear-capable ballistic missile (Government of India 2021c). The Agni-P is India’s first shorter-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to incorporate more sophisticated rocket motors, propellants, avionics packages, and navigation systems found in India’s newer, longer-range missiles like the Agni-IV and Agni-V. Importantly, the Agni-P is also carried in a sealed canister, similarly to the Agni-V[emphasis added, see post at start of this one] (Korda and Kristensen 2021). One senior DRDO official remarked during the early stages of the Agni-P’s development that, “As our ballistic missiles grew in range, our technology grew in sophistication. Now the early, short-range missiles, which incorporate older technol-ogies, will be replaced by missiles with more advanced technologies. Call it backward integration of technology” (Shukla 2016). Statements like these, coupled with the Agni-P’s clear capability upgrade over the early Agni-I and Agni-II missiles – which utilize older and less robust propellants, airframes, and hydraulic actuators, as well as less accurate guidance systems – suggest that the Agni-P will eventually replace these older missiles once it becomes operational (Shukla 2021b).
India is also developing a conventional SRBM known as the Pralay. The Pralay was most recently tested in December 2021 and is reportedly intended to take over the conventional role currently occupied by the dual-capable Prithvi-II and Agni-I SRBMs (Government of India 2021d; Unnithan 2021). The splitting of these nuclear and conventional short-range missions between the new Agni-P and Pralay missiles, respectively, could help reduce the risk of misunderstanding (conventional-nuclear entanglement) during a conflict. This could be further bolstered by the fact that the new Agni-P will likely be operated by Strategic Forces Command – which is responsible for India’s nuclear arsenal – while the Pralay will be operated by the Indian Army’s artillery corps (Philip 2021b).
The June 2021 test of India’s Agni-P missile was rumored to have carried two maneuverable decoys to simulate a payload equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs); however, this was not confirmed by the Indian Ministry of Defence (Pandit 2021). Similarly, press reports surrounding the Agni-V user trial in October 2021 claimed that the missile could be equipped with MIRVs (Rout 2021). However, there is good reason to doubt that India can or will add MIRVs to its missiles soon[emphasis added]. There are no official reports that the Indian government has approved a MIRV development program, and loading multiple warheads on the Agni-V would reduce its extra range – a key purpose of developing the missile in the first place.
The Agni-V is estimated to be capable of delivering a payload of 1.5 tons (the same as the Agni-III and Agni-IV), and India’s first- and second- generation warheads, even modified versions, are thought to be relatively heavy compared with warheads developed by other nuclear-armed states that deploy MIRVs. However, it took the Soviet Union and the United States hundreds of nuclear tests and 25 years of continued effort to develop re-entry vehicles small enough to equip a ballistic missile with MIRVs. Moreover, deploying missiles with multiple warheads would invite questions about the credibility of India’s minimum deterrent doctrine[emphasis added]; using MIRVs would reflect a strategy to quickly strike multiple targets and would also run the risk of triggering a warhead race with adversaries. Unless China develops an efficient missile defense system with capability against intermediate-range ballistic missiles, there seems to be no military need for MIRVs on Indian missiles (Kristensen 2013).
It seems likely, though, that China’s recent decision to equip some of its ICBMs with MIRVs, and Pakistan’s announcement in January 2017 that it had test-launched a new Ababeel medium-range ballistic missile with MIRVs, could strengthen the hand of those in the Indian military-industrial complex who favor development of a MIRV capability, if for no other reason than to avoid falling behind in MIRV technology development.
Although Ministry of Defence officials a few years ago indicated that India’s strategic missile force will be “capped for the present with the Agni-V, with no successor or next series on the horizon or even on the drawing board” (Gupta 2018), India apparently has also begun development of a true ICBM, known as Agni-VI[emphasis added]. Official data is scarce, but an article posted on the government’s Press Information Bureau website in December 2016 claimed the Agni “will have a strike- range of 8,000–10,000 kilometers” (4,970 to 6,210 miles) and will “be capable of being launched from submarines as well as from land” (Ghosh 2016). Whether these claims are accurate remains to be seen for a range improvement of roughly 50 percent to nearly 100 percent of that of the Agni-V seems exaggerated. The US Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates the range to be closer to 6,000 kilometers (3,730 miles) (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020).
India has also converted some of its ballistic missile technology into an anti-satellite interceptor[emphasis added]. In March 2019, the Defence Research and Development Organisation completed its first successful anti-satellite test “Mission Shakti” against one of its own satellites. According to the Indian Ministry of Defence, the interceptor was a three-stage missile with two solid rocket boosters, derived from its indigenous ballistic missile defense program (Ministry of Defence 2019, 96). The destruction of the satellite created a large debris field of hundreds of pieces, and while most reentered the Earth’s atmosphere, dozens were kicked into higher orbit by the impact (Grush 2019). Unidentified Indian military sources have also speculated that the interceptor likely utilizes the same propulsion system as that of the Agni-V ballistic missile, which is still in development (Bedi 2019)…
A wide and growing suite of capabilities; keep in mind the two fronts the Indians face.
Mr. Stevenson is a journalist specializing in energy, defense and geopolitics who reported from Ukraine during the first weeks of the war.
…The U.S. secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin, has said the goal is “to see Russia weakened.” The speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, said Ukraine is defending “democracy writ large for the world.” Britain’s foreign minister, Liz Truss, was explicit about widening the conflict to take in Ukrainian territory annexed by Russia, such as Crimea, when she spoke of evicting Russia from “the whole of Ukraine.” This is both an expansion of the battlefield and a transformation of the war.
…Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia were always fraught but contained moments of promise. They have now stalled completely. Russia bears its fair share of responsibility, of course. But European channels to Moscow have been all but severed, and there is no serious effort from the United States to seek diplomatic progress, let alone cease-fires.
When I was in Ukraine during the first weeks of the war, even staunch Ukrainian nationalists expressed views far more pragmatic than those that are routine in America now. Talk of neutral status for Ukraine and internationally monitored plebiscites in Donetsk and Luhansk has been jettisoned in favor of bombast and grandstanding.
The war was dangerous and destructive enough in its initial form. The combination of expanded strategic aims and scotched negotiations has made it more dangerous still. At present, the only message to Russia is: There is no way out. Though President Vladimir Putin did not declare general conscription in his Victory Day speech on May 9, a conventional escalation of this kind is still possible.
Nuclear weapons are discussed in easy tones, not least on Russian television. The risk of cities being reduced to corium remains low without NATO deployment in Ukraine, but accident and miscalculation cannot be discounted. And the conflict takes place at a time when most of the Cold War arms control agreements between the United States and Russia have been allowed to lapse.
A weakened Russia was a likely outcome of the war even before the shift in U.S. policy. Russia’s economic position has deteriorated. Far from a commodity superpower, its undersized domestic industry is struggling and is dependent on technology imports that are now inaccessible.
What’s more, the invasion has led directly to greater military spending in second- and third-tier European powers. The number of NATO troops in Eastern Europe has grown tenfold, and a Nordic expansion of the organization is likely. A general rearmament of Europe is taking place, driven not by desire for autonomy from American power but in service to it. For the United States, this should be success enough. It is unclear what more there is to gain by weakening Russia, beyond fantasies of regime change.
Ukraine’s future depends on the course of the fighting in the Donbas and perhaps the south. The physical destruction of the east is already well underway. Ukrainian casualties are not insignificant; estimates of the number killed and wounded vary widely, but it is certainly in the tens of thousands. Russia has destroyed whatever sense of shared heritage remained before the invasion.
But the longer the war, the worse the damage to Ukraine and the greater the risk of escalation. A decisive military result in eastern Ukraine may prove elusive. Yet the less dramatic outcome of a festering stalemate is hardly better. Indefinite protraction of the war, as in Syria, is too dangerous with nuclear-armed participants.
Diplomatic efforts ought to be the centerpiece of a new Ukraine strategy. Instead, the war’s boundaries are being expanded and the war itself recast as a struggle between democracy and autocracy, in which the Donbas is the frontier of freedom. This is not just declamatory extravagance. It is reckless. The risks hardly need to be stated.
2) And by the “Sunday Review’s” house conservative:
Our success…yields new strategic dilemmas. Two scenarios loom for the next six months of war. In the first, Russia and Ukraine trade territory in small increments, and the war gradually cools into a “frozen conflict” in a style familiar from other wars in Russia’s near abroad.
Under those circumstances, any lasting peace deal would probably require conceding Russian control over some conquered territory, in Crimea and the Donbas, if not the land bridge now mostly held by Russian forces in between. This would hand Moscow a clear reward for its aggression, notwithstanding everything else that Russia has lost in the course of its invasion. And depending on how much territory was ceded, it would leave Ukraine mutilated and weakened, notwithstanding its military success.
So such a deal might seem unacceptable in Kyiv, Washington or both. But then the alternative — a permanent stalemate that’s always poised for a return to low-grade war — would also leave Ukraine mutilated and weakened, reliant on streams of Western money and military equipment, and less able to confidently rebuild…
There is…[a] scenario…in which…the stalemate breaks in Ukraine’s favor. This is the future that the Ukrainian military claims is within reach — where with sufficient military aid and hardware they are able to turn their modest counteroffensives into major ones and push the Russians back not just to prewar lines but potentially out of Ukrainian territory entirely.
Clearly, this is the future America should want — except for the extremely important caveat that it’s also the future where Russian nuclear escalation suddenly becomes much more likely than it is right now.
We know that Russian military doctrine envisions using tactical nuclear weapons defensively, to turn the tide in a losing war[emphasis added, see post noted at the bottom of this one]. We should assume that Putin and his circle regard total defeat in Ukraine as a regime-threatening scenario. Combine those realities with a world where the Russians are suddenly being routed, their territorial gains evaporating, and you have the most nuclear-shadowed military situation since our naval blockade of Cuba in 1962.
I’ve been turning over these dilemmas since I moderated a recent panel at the Catholic University of America with three right-of-center foreign policy thinkers — Elbridge Colby, Rebeccah Heinrichs and Jakub Grygiel. On the wisdom of our support for Ukraine up till now, the panel was basically united. On the question of the war’s endgame and the nuclear peril, however, you could see our challenges distilled — with Grygiel emphasizing the importance of Ukraine’s recovering territory in the east and along the Black Sea coastline in order to be plausibly self-sufficient in the future, but then the more hawkish Heinrichs and the more cautious Colby sparring over what our posture should be in the event that rapid Ukrainian advances are met with a Russian tactical nuclear strike.
That question isn’t the one immediately before us; it will only become an issue if Ukraine begins to make substantial gains. But since we are arming the Ukrainians on a scale that seems intended to make a counteroffensive possible, I sincerely hope a version of the Colby-Heinrichs back-and-forth is happening at the highest reaches of our government — before an issue that matters now on academic panels becomes the most important question in the world.
EPAExperts told the BBC that any weapon could cause chaos for the satellite reliant US (file image)
Getty ImagesThe US military is heavily dependent on satellites for everything from navigation to targeting.
Getty ImagesThe US Space Force formally became a branch of the US military in December 2019.
Mark Collins 3Ds Blog 
