There’s a lot more involved than the funding announcements, new radar systems and infrastructure that the government has highlighted. In particular the government has said little publicly about various major changes to NORAD’s strategic focuses and operational priorities that the US has been considering. Further to this post,
NORAD: Where Trudeau Government Plans to Spend Money over Next 20 Years
here are my extracts from a substantial “commentary” at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute think thank by a professor at the University of Manitoba (see end of the quote), one of the few Canadian academics really on top of this subject and its technical ramifications–along with his colleague Andrea Charron:
North American defence modernization in an age of uncertainty
This commentary by James Fergusson looks at the future of NORAD modernization and the threat posed by new military technologies.
First formally identified as a priority in the 2017 defence white paper, Strong, Secure and Engaged, and three years after NORAD modernization was identified in Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s mandate letter to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, the Trudeau government has finally earmarked funds for North American defence modernization. In the 2021 federal budget, the government did commit by defence standards, a paltry $252 million to “lay the groundwork for North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) modernization and sustain existing continental and Arctic defence capabilities” (Canada 2021). Yet no spending details were provided.
Subsequently, in January 2022, the government awarded a $592 million contract for in-service support of the North Warning System (NWS).[1] In the recent 2022 budget, $6.1 billion over five years was added to the defence budget (Canada 2022b), although the amount committed to NORAD modernization was left unspecified. In June, Defence Minister Anand announced $4.9 billion over six years, and $40 billion over 20 years for modernization with some additional details.[2] A month later on July 21, the Department of National Defence (DND) provided further details on its fact sheet [see here], though this still lacked specificity [emphasis added].
The announcement and subsequent July DND fact sheet raise two areas for evaluation. The first concerns the funding commitments relative to the reality of defence spending in Canada and infrastructure construction in the Canadian Arctic. The second relates to the underlying policy implications, which have not been acknowledged or presented [emphasis added]…
…North America, NORAD and the Arctic NWS in particular are a politically sensitive domestic issue because of longstanding Canadian sovereignty concerns relative to the United States. As such, North American defence cooperation is always liable to the general state of relations between Canada and the United States, which is one of the reasons why Ottawa has preferred NORAD to operate beneath the political radar in Canada [emphasis added].
In this regard, highly negative Canadian attitudes towards the Trump presidency arguably made forward movement politically risky and, as such, one might interpret the 2017 commitment sans detail and money as a political “trial balloon.” Regardless, the election of US President Biden in 2020 changed the political climate overnight. In addition, the Russian invasion of Ukraine eliminated any potential domestic political opposition to NORAD modernization, which one might have expected with charges of “militarizing” the Arctic and “kowtowing” to the Americans…
Of course, building new radar lines or any other NORAD-related Arctic infrastructure is no easy task, with a short construction season, limited maritime transportation capacity and the large distances involved.[9] Alongside this reality, six years is a very short time in the historically lengthy Canadian procurement process with an average closer to 15 years. Assuming that the internal specification of requirements process has been completed for the unspecified first six-year stage, requests for proposals or bids have to be issued, companies need to construct their bids taking into account buy Canadian provisions in terms of industrial and technological benefits, as well as the government’s commitment to significant Indigenous participation. Next, the bids must be evaluated, contracts issued and finally the acquisition and deployment undertaken.[10] Where this all stands today is unknown publicly [emphasis added].
In other words, the likelihood that DND can spend $4.9 billion over six years appears very low [emphasis added]…
…No one can realistically predict the state of the economy over the next year or so, never mind 20 years. And National Defence will not be immune from government fiscal retrenchment or demands to re-direct funds during an economic downturn to other more politically salient economic and social pressures.
Alongside these factors, if history is our guide, the actual final costs of NORAD modernization are likely to exceed significantly $40 billion, especially given the unpredictable costs of acquiring new advanced technologies for the NORAD mission suite as they emerge over the next 20 years [emphasis added]…
…As deterrence by denial is the central underlying strategic rationale for NORAD modernization, demonstrated capabilities and their communication to existing and potential adversaries are important. Furthermore, with modern space-based capabilities, nothing can be truly hidden. In other words, not least of all relative to the transparency and accountability mantra of the government and the magnitude of investment, the government and DND need to be more forthcoming on NORAD modernization. This, in turn, is linked to the unspoken parameters or limits of NORAD modernization in government thinking about Canada’s role in the defence of North America [emphasis added].
As best that can be discerned from DND’s announcements, NORAD modernization is primarily limited to the Arctic approaches and dominated by the NWS replacement, now labelled the Northern Approaches Surveillance System (NASS), supporting infrastructure (forward operating locations) and associated command, control and communication infrastructure. At Trenton, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), in reply to a media question, stated, “for Canada, we are focused upon 10 to 2 o’clock that is why it is so important we are integrated with the US as they cover the other avenues of approaches” (CPAC 2022). Apparently, at least for now, the east and west coasts of Canada (9 to 10, and 2 to 3 o’clock) are solely an American responsibility. What this, in turn, entails in terms of surveillance infrastructure relative to Canadian territory is unspecified [emphasis added].
…Indicative today is the previous NORAD Commander’s emphasis on obtaining Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Although the current Commander, US General Glen VanHerck, has dropped it from the current NORAD lexicon, it remains in play in the United States military generally and is implicitly embedded in his objective to ensure that NORAD has all-domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority for deterrence, defence and warfighting [emphasis added] (NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs 2021).
…Although unclear, the new NASS will likely be located across the Canadian High Arctic. Consideration also needs to be given to developing a radar network at the lower latitudes. If cruise and hypersonic missiles pass over the Arctic line, there exists no significant capability to track them [emphasis added], as internal civilian radars integrated into NORAD after 9/11 lack the capacity. Of course, these radars could be located in the northern continental United States, but no information has been provided.
This, in turn, raises the government’s funding commitment to the active defence or interception side of the deterrence equation. For now, the government is committed only to acquire new short-, medium- and long-range air-to-air missiles for the new F-35 interceptor fleet (a requirement for NORAD and overseas missions). It has also committed to a new air-to-air refuelling fleet to extend the range of the F-35, allowing it to intercept bombers and other aircraft (archers in NORAD parlance) capable of standoff air-launched missiles. Even so, the probability of intercepting the archers is difficult to estimate and depends upon the ratio of bombers (as well as submarines) and missiles to interceptors. The likelihood that all the archers and the missiles (arrows) will be defeated is below 100 percent. No defence is perfect. Besides, striking at the archers close to, if not in, Russian territory implies NORAD acquiring a pre-emptive strike capability, which will likely prove problematic for the Canadian government, which perceives NORAD as a defensive, reactive institution, not an offensive one [emphasis added].
Regardless, NORAD is in the missile defence world, and this raises the issue of whether Canada needs to invest in ground-based point defences (surface-to-air missiles) to protect high-valued targets [emphasis added]. Such targets are twofold: Canadian cities and industrial centres, and military bases. In terms of the latter, this includes the NASS itself and Arctic forward operating locations. Such defences, however, raise the thorny issue of ballistic missile defence, which the defence minister at Trenton stated there was no policy change, but the government would continue to track the issue.
Someday, perhaps, the government will explain its allergy to ballistic missile defence [emphasis added]…
All of these policy implications, conveniently ignored in the NORAD modernization announcements, suggest a major transformation of NORAD is on the horizon [emphasis added, see posts noted below]. In some ways, they are reminiscent of the policy implications of initial Canadian-American air defence cooperation in the 1950s, which led to the creation of NORAD itself as a function of military requirements. In other words, NORAD modernization is much more than new infrastructure. It is about a much broader and deeper NORAD and thus an expanded and new continental defence relationship [emphasis added–heard anything about that from this government?].
If the past is a guide, this will take place with little, if any, Canadian public debate about a “new” NORAD, as the government seeks to avoid the sensitive and feared issue of Canadian sovereignty relative to the United States. Perhaps it would be better if the government and DND go beyond simple funding announcements, as important as they are, to the lay the groundwork for a well-informed public debate…
Certainly, NORAD and DND officials are well aware of the implications of NORAD modernization beyond new infrastructure, as may be the government in previously announcing a defence review [emphasis added]. Unfortunately, like the relative paucity of information and timelines in the funding announcements, both have been silent about the nature and scope of the review. Regardless, time is pressing, and for the foreseeable future North America and Canada will remain vulnerable to the threat posed by the new military technologies, which can affect how both Canada and the United States respond to future international crises overseas…
In effect, the funding commitments are an important first step. Beyond that, the government needs to be more forthcoming to ensure a mature, well-informed debate on North American defence and NORAD [emphasis added]. No longer can government and DND simply ignore North America for long stretches to time. The world has changed, and with it the significance of North American defence. Funding is just the tip of the iceberg.
About the author
James Fergusson is the Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba and Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba. He is the co-author with Andrea Charron of NORAD: In Perpetuity and Beyond. He received his BA (Hons) and MA degrees from the University of Manitoba and his Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia in 1989. He teaches a range of courses in the areas of international relations, foreign and defence policy, and strategic studies. He has published numerous articles on strategic studies, non-proliferation and arms control, the defence industry, and Canadian foreign and defence policy
Other posts on evolving US thinking about NORAD (most recent first):
NORAD: Looks Like US Largely Giving Up on Shooting Down Cruise Missiles at Long Distance from Targets
What Worries the NORTHCOM/NORAD COMMANDER? What Worries PM Trudeau’s Government about Continental Defence? Note UPDATE
Here’s Looking at NORAD/NORTHCOM’s Way Ahead, or, Deterrence and Punishment
Rethinking and Remaking North American Defence, or, a Revolution in NORAD Affairs? How, er, Proactive?
NORAD Chief Wants Defence (of what sort?) “Left of Launch” Focus, Russian Cruise Missiles (air- and sub-launched) Big Threat
NORAD (and NORTHCOM) Thinking Offense of some sort vs Russian Threats–what does Canadian Government Think?
As Prof. Fergusson says we still have little idea about what our government thinks. Perhaps it is simply avoiding thinking about difficult matters that might well present, er, challenges in terms of public reaction if discussed with any seriousness. Just stick with emphasizing the money spent in Canada, especially with indigenous communities and on high-tech, and jobs.
Mark Collins
Twitter: @Mark3ds
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